

R
201100

JPRS-SEA-84-080

1 June 1984

Southeast Asia Report

VIETNAM

TAP CHI CONG SAN

No. 3, March 1984

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

19990929 142

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

6
77
A05

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

1 June 1984

SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

VIETNAM

TAP CHI CONG SAN
No. 3, March 1984

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the monthly theoretical and political journal of the Vietnam Communist Party published in Hanoi.

CONTENTS

Displaying High Vigilance, Defending the Fatherland (pp 1-6) (Editorial).....	1
Notice from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the National Assembly, the Council of State and the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the Death of Y.V. Andropov (p 7).....	7
Eulogy to Y.V. Andropov by the Party Central Committee, National Assembly, Council of State, Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (pp 8-10) (This item was published in the DAILY REPORT, Asia & Pacific, 15 Feb 84, Volume IV, No 032, pp K2-3)	
Tapping the Strength of Collective Ownership in Order to Successfully Implement the 1984 Socio-Economic Plan (pp 11-15, 26) (Unattributed article).....	8
Some Matters Pertaining to Military Art in the 1953-1954 Winter- Spring Offensive and the Dien Bien Phu Campaign (pp 16-26) (Hoang Van Thai).....	15
Some Matters Regarding Distribution and Circulation (pp 27-33) (Tran Ho).....	28
A Pinnacle of Great Victory (pp 34-37 and 55) (Thanh Tin).....	37
Exchange of Opinions on Building the District and Strengthening the District Level: The Significance of Building the District and Strengthening the District Level (pp 38-43) (Nguyen Le).....	42

Thai Binh Builds Its District Party Organizations and Strengthens Its Basic Organizations of the Party (pp 43-49) (Truong Dang Hoa).....	49
Some Important Measures Behind Economic Development in Duy Tien District (pp 50-55) (Nguyen Van My).....	58
Studies: The Laws of the Socialist Revolution and Socialist Construction--Establishing the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in One Form or Another (pp 56-62 and 70) (Quyet Tien).....	65
The Vitality of a Community with a 4,000 Year History of Civilization (pp 63-66) (Le Xuan Vu) (not translated)(article introduces a three part collection on Vietnamese literature: literature under the Ly and Tran Dynasties, the folk literature of the Vietnamese and the folk literature of the fraternal minorities, published by the Social Sciences Publishing House)	
From Several Vietnamese Feature Films Produced in 1983 (pp 67-70) (Tran Dac) (not translated) (article reviews a number of feature films made in 1983)	

DISPLAYING HIGH VIGILANCE, DEFENDING THE FATHERLAND

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 84 pp 1-6

[Editorial on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the victory over the war of aggression of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists]

[Text] Five years ago, our army and people, by uniting as one and fighting bravely, defeated the war of aggression of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists on the northern border of our country. This glorious victory has been recorded in history as an important milestone in our people's defense of the socialist fatherland.

Following the 30 years they had spent resisting the French imperialists and then the U.S. imperialists in order to win national independence and reunify the country, our people had no aspiration other than to live in peace and rebuild their war torn country so that everyone could be well fed, well clothed and educated and able to find happiness. This legitimate and fervent aspiration of our people was brazenly trampled upon by the reactionaries within Beijing ruling circles. On 17 February 1979, having been defeated in their plan to use the Pol Pot clique, their lackey, to invade and occupy South Vietnam, the government leaders of the PRC arrogantly launched an attack against the entire northern border of our country. This war of aggression was the extremely malicious action of the group of reactionaries within Chinese ruling circles who are disciples of great nation expansionism and big country hegemony.

Following the lead of Mao Zedong, the rulers of China have long nurtured a dream of expansionism and hegemony with regard to Vietnam, not unlike the Chinese emperors of ancient times. Was it not Mao Zedong himself who often declared that Vietnam is "territory of China" seized and occupied by imperialism? Annexing Vietnam and Indochina is part of the global strategy of the Beijing reactionaries to establish their rule in Southeast Asia, in Africa and Latin America and throughout the world. They consider a socialist Vietnam that pursues an independent domestic and foreign policy to be a major obstacle to their scheme of expansion and hegemony.

In launching a war of aggression against Vietnam, the rulers of China revealed their true identity as traitors to Marxism-Leninism, as opponents of

socialism, national independence and peace. By attacking and murdering Vietnamese, whose fight for national liberation during the past several decades was closely linked to the fight being waged by the people of China and made positive contributions to the protection of southern China, the rulers in Beijing betrayed the legitimate interests of the Chinese people, betrayed the traditional friendship between the peoples of Vietnam and China.

The vile treachery and the war of aggression of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists placed our country in a perilous situation. But our people never once wavered. Uniting 1 million persons as 1, our army and people arose and fought the enemy. Upholding and enhancing the nation's tradition of brave resistance against foreign aggression, our army and people, fearing neither hardship nor sacrifice and fighting tenaciously, defeated the 600,000 man aggressor army of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists.

We won victory over the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists because our line is correct, because the war we fought was just, because our army and people were united as one, were determined to resist foreign aggression and because our nation has a tradition of unyielding struggle to win and maintain the independence of the fatherland. The beautiful system of socialist collective ownership was the source of our inexhaustible strength in defeating the enemy. The solidarity of the peoples of the three countries of Indochina was also a great strength, one that spelled certain defeat for the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists. Our victory was also the victory of the three revolutionary currents in the world, the victory of the strength of the solidarity between our country and the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries within the socialist community and the victory of the people of the world who sympathized with, supported and assisted our people in resisting Chinese aggression.

Despite suffering a shameful defeat in their war of aggression against Vietnam in early 1979, the reactionaries within Chinese ruling circles have not abandoned their plan to invade our country and turn Vietnam and the two fraternal countries of Laos and Kampuchea into Chinese provinces. Throughout the past 5 years, they have been waging a wide-ranging war of sabotage against our country and the two countries of Laos and Kampuchea. Through this war, they hope to bring about our collapse without having to resort to a large-scale war. At the same time, they continue to make preparations for a large-scale war of aggression to occupy our country.

Militarily, they have massed troops along our border and routinely engage in acts of intimidation and provocation and initiate armed clashes while attempting to establish counter-revolutionary bases, foment rebellion and topple us from within. Economically, they are making every effort to sabotage us by setting warehouses afire, damaging machinery and equipment and undermining our socialist transformation and socialist construction. On the other hand, they have intensified the spy war and the psychological war against our country; they are sending persons into our country to conduct acts of sabotage, gather intelligence information, spread malicious rumors, secretly organize opposition organizations and activities, disrupt order and security and undermine us ideologically, politically and organizationally.

Together with their scheme and actions against Vietnam, they are also making every effort to assemble lackey forces and intensify their acts of sabotage in Laos and Kampuchea.

Although the Beijing reactionaries' goal of annexing Vietnam and the two countries on the Indochina peninsula that are friends of Vietnam has never changed, the methods and measures employed by them to achieve it have changed. When they suffered a heavy defeat in early 1979 in their "human wave" style of war in which 600,000 troops fiercely attacked the entire northern border of our country, the Chinese reactionaries were forced to shift their efforts to a "wide-ranging war of sabotage" to "make Vietnam bleed" until it is exhausted as they have brazenly and cruelly stated on many occasions. Although the kind of war that the Chinese reactionaries are waging against Vietnam has changed, their strategic objective has not changed at all. It is to invade and occupy Vietnam, to turn Vietnam into a province of China.

The realities of the past 5 years prove that the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists are fiercely opposed to the national independence and socialism of Vietnam, of the countries of Indochina. The Chinese reactionaries have occupied the Paracel Islands of Vietnam for more than 10 years. While carrying out their scheme to oppose and undermine Vietnam, oppose and undermine the countries of Indochina, the Chinese reactionaries have been collaborating ever more closely with the U.S. imperialists who, in turn, are using China's betrayal in a vain attempt to return to Indochina, to Vietnam.

Despite the strenuous efforts being made by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists to oppose and undermine it, the Vietnamese revolution has continued to move steadily forward. It is true that Vietnam is still "bleeding" to some extent as a result of the criminal actions taken by the Chinese reactionaries in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists, but Vietnam remains firmly on its feet, Vietnam is not "exhausted" and Vietnam has not "collapsed" as hoped by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, the U.S. imperialists and the other reactionaries.

During the past 5 years, our people have recorded tremendous achievements in socialist construction and the defense of the fatherland. The achievements that our people have recorded in agricultural production, industry, communications-transportation, capital construction and so forth prove that the schemes and actions being carried out by China in collaboration with the economic embargo and sabotage against us by the United States have not yielded the results desired by them. Our political security, our social order and safety have been firmly maintained; the political and moral consensus among our people has been solidified and strengthened. These are clear proof of the failure of the enemy's psychological war and spy war against our country. The defense forces of our country are stronger now than ever before. The provocative attacks, the acts of encroachment and occupation and the violation of our territory by the Chinese army along the northern border of our country have brought appropriate retaliation. The historical realities of the past 5 years prove that the "wide-ranging war of sabotage" being waged against Vietnam by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists has been and is a failure and will surely end in total failure.

The Chinese expansionists and hegemonists have not only tasted defeat in Vietnam, but also in Laos and Kampuchea. The continuous growth and the steady advance toward socialism by the People's Democratic Republic of Laos mark the failure of the Chinese reactionaries' scheme of sabotage and subversion in Laos. The remarkable rebirth of the country of Angkor following its escape from genocide at the hands of the Pol Pot clique, the lackey of China, and the rapid growth of the People's Republic of Kampuchea prove that the sinister scheme of the Chinese reactionaries in Kampuchea has been and is a failure as well.

By winning victory together and advancing toward socialism together, the three countries of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have established a new situation of unprecedented stability in this region of the world. The high level conference of the three countries of Indochina held in Vientiane in February, 1983, was an important milestone in the history of the development of the relations of friendship and cooperation among these three fraternal nations. The conference marked a new stage of development in the cooperation and mutual assistance among the peoples of the three countries in the work of building socialism and defending the fatherland.

The international position of Vietnam, as well as of Laos and Kampuchea, has constantly been enhanced. The comprehensive alliance between our country and the Soviet Union has had a positive impact upon our people's socialist construction and defense of the fatherland. The solidarity, cooperation and mutual assistance between our country and the other countries of the socialist community are becoming stronger with each day that passes. Our country's expanding international relations prove the failure of the scheme of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and the U.S. imperialists to surround and isolate our country.

Having successfully met serious challenges during the past 5 years, we have the basis for unequivocally stating that, regardless of how villainous the schemes carried out by the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists to oppose our country might be, our people still possess all the strength needed to defeat these schemes, firmly defend our fatherland and successfully build socialism in our country.

More than 5 years ago, after our people had won victory over two imperialist powers, France and the United States, some persons were still worried about whether or not our country was strong enough to contend with aggression by Great China expansionism. These persons maintained that we were able to win victory over France and the United States because these countries are far away and had to cross the ocean to reach our country; we were fighting the enemy in our own land and were thus able to win victory over France and the United States. China, on the other hand, lies right next to our country, shares mountains and rivers with us and shares a border with us that extends for thousands of kilometers. Although China is not as modern as France and the United States, it does have a large population and a large army. If China were to use humans as cannon fodder, were to launch a heavy attack through a "human wave" type of war, would we be strong enough to successfully resist?

This concern, although partially grounded, was incorrect because it failed to take into consideration the fundamental weakness of Great China expansionism and hegemony as well as the fundamental strength of our nation. The fundamental weakness of the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists was the unjust nature of their war of aggression. Due to the unjust nature of their war, they were opposed by the people of their country, their army refused to be used as cannon fodder and the people of the world also sternly opposed them. They are divided internally; they fight with and eliminate one another. Therefore, they are large but not strong. As regards the so called "human wave type of war" about which the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists frequently talk in order to intimidate the rest of the world, the fundamental weakness of this kind of war was pointed out by Lenin nearly 80 years ago: "In the age of rapid fire, small caliber weapons, heavy mechanized artillery and warships equipped with complex technology, in an age in which the units employed in ground combat are dispersed--in such an age, there is no degree of flexibility, no degree of physical conditioning, no form of human wave combat that gives one side an advantage."(1) Today, the weapons and technology of war are vastly more developed than they were during Lenin's time, consequently, his words are even more correct. The victory of the army and people of Vietnam in early 1979 over the "human wave type of war" of the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists is proof of the correctness of Lenin's argument.

As for ourselves, our fundamental strength is the just nature of the war to defend the socialist fatherland. Due to the just nature of our war, we possess the strength of the army and people sharing a common will. Our entire party, our entire army and all our people are united, are ready to fight and fight bravely against foreign aggression to defend the fatherland. We possess the combined strength of a totally independent, unified and socialist country. The revolutionary line that we follow is correct and creative. We possess the strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the system of socialist collective ownership. We possess the strength of the solidarity of the three fraternal nations on the Indochina peninsula. We possess the strength of the three revolutionary currents in the world. We possess the strength of the solidarity between our country and the Soviet Union and other countries within the socialist community. We possess the strength of the sympathy and support of the people of the world, including the Chinese people. With this combined strength, our people will surely win victory over any enemy aggressor and firmly defend our socialist fatherland. This has been proven by the vivid realities of the past 5 years. We not only won victory over the human wave type of war of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, but have been and are defending their wide-ranging war of sabotage as well. The realities of the past 5 years prove that, under the wise leadership of the party, our people possess all the strength needed to win victory over any kind of war of aggression waged by the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists in order to defend our fatherland.

The reactionary disciples of Maoism within Chinese ruling circles are the immediate, dangerous enemy of our people. Imperialism, headed by U.S. imperialism, is the basic and long-range enemy of our country's revolution and the world revolution. Highly vigilant and combat ready, our people are determined to defeat each scheme and act of aggression carried out by the

Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists, firmly defend their beloved fatherland and fulfill their international obligation to the fraternal peoples of Laos and Kampuchea. By means of their fight, our people are making positive contributions to the maintenance of national independence, peace and stability in Southeast Asia and contributing to the revolutionary undertaking of and the safeguarding of peace by the people of the world, including the people of China.

Closely coordinating the economy with the national defense system, the national defense system with the economy, we must make every effort to carry out the two strategic tasks of successfully building socialism and firmly defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland. We must make every effort to develop production so that our country is strong under all circumstances and we can defeat the plan of the enemy to weaken and bring down our country. At the same time, production must be developed to create the material strength needed to win victory over a large-scale war of aggression should the enemy recklessly unleash such a war. Only by developing production can we establish the conditions needed to improve the standard of living of our people, develop upon the superior nature of socialism and cause our people to be closely attached to the socialist system, be ready to fight and die to firmly defend our beautiful system.

In conjunction with developing production and building socialism, we must also make every effort to build a strong national defense system and improve the quality of the armed forces so that they are always in a state of combat readiness, always able to effectively deal with each situation.

In celebration of the 5th anniversary of the victory over the Chinese aggressor army, let us correctly evaluate our country's revolution during the past 5 years, realize our large victories and the enemy's heavy defeats, see the sinister scheme of the enemy and the glorious tasks that are ours, strengthen our unity and make every effort to move our people's revolutionary undertaking strongly and steadily forward.

President Ho said: "There is nothing more precious than independence and freedom." In keeping with this teaching of President Ho, let us display high vigilance, be ready to fight and fight bravely to defeat each scheme and act of aggression of the enemy and firmly maintain the independence and freedom for which our nation shed so much blood to win.

Everything for the cause of building and defending the socialist fatherland, for the happiness of the people.

FOOTNOTES

1. V.I. Lenin: "The Fall of the Seaport of Lu Thuan," Complete Works, Progress Publishing, Moscow, 1979, Volume 9, pp 191-192.

NOTICE FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, THE COUNCIL OF STATE AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ON THE DEATH OF Y.V. ANDROPOV

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 84 p 7

[Text] It is with the deepest sadness that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the National Assembly, the Council of State and the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam inform the party and people of Vietnam:

Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, died at 1650 hours on 9 February 1984 in Moscow.

The name and tireless activities of Y.V. Andropov are closely associated with large victories by the Soviet Union in developing the national economy and improving the welfare of the people, in strengthening the national defense capabilities of the Soviet Union and improving the prospects for safeguarding peace on the planet. Y.V. Andropov was especially concerned with strengthening the unity and solidarity of the socialist community and the international communist movement.

The death of Y.V. Andropov is a major loss to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, to our party and people and progressive mankind.

7809

CSO: 4210/19

TAPPING THE STRENGTH OF COLLECTIVE OWNERSHIP IN ORDER TO SUCCESSFULLY
IMPLEMENT THE 1984 SOCIO-ECONOMIC PLAN

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 84 pp 11-15, 26

[Unattributed article]

[Text] During the 3 years from 1981 to 1983, in keeping with the resolution of the 5th Congress of the Party and the resolutions of the Party Central Committee, our people won large victories in their work of carrying out the two strategic tasks: building socialism and defending the socialist fatherland. The economy, which had declined in 1979 and 1980, is improving and becoming stable, thus laying the foundation for new stages of development.

Agricultural production, industrial production and national income have increased with each passing year, thereby marking an important step forward in the process of stabilizing the socio-economic situation and strengthening the socialist economy. The most significant progress has been made in grain production. Whereas grain output only increased at the annual rate of roughly 200,000 tons between 1976 and 1980, during the past 3 years, output rose at the average annual rate of nearly 1 million tons. Numerous localities have made clear progress in raising rice yields. The emulation movement to record average yields of 8-10 tons on a district-wide basis is developing. This progress shows that there is still very much potential within our country's agriculture for raising rice yields through intensive cultivation.

As a result of the development of production and the impact of recently promulgated policies, the quantity of grain procured by the state has increased significantly. In previous years, the state only procured about 2 million tons per year; during the past 3 years, the state procured an average of 3.1 million tons per year. As a result, in 1983, we did not have to import grain and virtually met the minimum need for grain throughout the country. Our victory in this area holds the prospect of not only achieving self-sufficiency in grain, but also establishing grain reserves.

Along with grain production, the planting of industrial crops, livestock production, forestry and fishing have been developing well.

Although many difficulties with energy, raw materials and spare parts have been encountered in industrial production, many enterprises, by displaying initiative and creativity, developing their potentials and establishing cooperation and economic ties with other units, have overcome some of their difficulties, maintained and developed their production and supported the living standard of workers to some extent. The output value of industry, small industry and the handicraft trades increased considerably in 1983 compared to 1980.

In communications and transportation, good changes have occurred in organization and management and advances have been made in the transportation of cargo and passengers.

In export activities, marked progress has been made in increasing the total value of goods exported.

The domestic market has begun to be reorganized, especially the grain market; many other types of agricultural products are also being procured in rather large quantities.

New changes are occurring in the socialist transformation of agriculture in the provinces of Nam Bo. The socialist transformation of private industry and commerce is being reorganized.

Attention is being given to promoting scientific, technical, cultural, educational and art activities, thereby making important contributions to the cultural and spiritual lives of the people. A number of units have emerged that are models of how to uphold the right of collective ownership, how to establish a civilized, wholesome life and how to care for disabled veterans, the families of war dead, orphans and the handicapped.

For us to record the achievements described above in the face of acute difficulties in many areas, repeated natural disasters and the very pernicious wide-ranging war of sabotage being waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists represents a major victory. This victory has its origins primarily in the correct line of the party; in the improvements made to economic policies and economic management, improvements that have imbued workers with enthusiasm for their work and made them responsible for the products produced; in the struggle waged by the entire country, by all sectors, localities and installations in the spirit of collective ownership and self-reliance. This victory is also the result of the cooperation and tremendous assistance of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries.

However, the achievements that we have recorded are only initial achievements and the progress that we have made has not been uniform or steady. Our country's economy is still in a very difficult situation and some of the difficulties being experienced are very acute. The supply of grain only meets the minimum needs of humans and a small portion of the need for grain in livestock production; there is not enough grain to meet the large needs involved in developing the production of industrial crops on a large scale and opening new economic zones. The continuing decline in subsidiary food crop

output has reduced the output of grain by tens of thousands of tons. The lack of an adequate awareness of the importance of industrial crops and the failure to closely guide the development of their production are a shortcoming that has affected the sources of export goods. We are still making mistakes with regard to developing the potentials that lie in marine products, especially shrimp, fresh water fish and brackish water fish, and the potentials that lie in forestry products. Deserving of attention is the fact that the output of many important products, of products that are essential in production and the daily lives of the people, especially electricity, coal, pesticides, fertilizer, cloth, medicine and so forth, has increased slowly or not increased at all.

In the management of production, light attention is given to qualitative standards, as a result of which productivity, quality and efficiency are, generally speaking, still low in production, construction, transportation and business. The waste of materials and goods is still quite widespread and, in some cases, serious waste has occurred. This must be viewed as a major shortcoming, especially at a time when our country's economy is still weak and the supply of products is not abundant. Distribution and circulation continue to be the field in which we are experiencing the greatest difficulties. The state still does not control the majority of goods and money and has yet to become the master of the market and prices. Socialist commerce has still not freed itself from administrative procedures and subsidization, has not moved forward to play the dominant role in the market. The shortcomings in distribution and circulation have directly affected the standard of living of the people, especially manual workers, civil servants and the armed forces.

The situation described above has many objective and subjective causes. Subjectively, we must recognize the shortcomings that exist in the management and planning system. This system, which has been improved slowly to comply with the guidelines established by our party, does not enable the various levels to join together and truly exercise control in order to better mobilize the combined forces of the state and the people, of the central and local levels; as a result, many potentials that lie within our reach are still not being tapped.

Our country's situation at this point in time and its revolutionary tasks demand that stronger, more comprehensive change be brought about in socio-economic development, demand that we fully comprehend and successfully carry out the tasks set forth at the 5th Congress of the Party.

The tasks for the 2 years 1984 and 1985 are very important and large: we must meet the objectives established for the 1981-1985 period and basically stabilize the economy and social situation while taking positive steps to prepare for the 1986-1990 plan.

The implementation of the 1984 plan and the plan for 1985 must be closely linked to implementing the guidelines on socio-economic development by 1990 so that we can continue to thoroughly implement the general line of the party and its specific line on building the socialist economy in the initial stage of the period of transition to socialism. Here, our foremost task is to advance agriculture one step closer to large-scale, socialist production within a

rational industrial-agricultural structure with a view toward achieving the four general socio-economic goals and preparing the conditions needed to carry out industrialization on a large scale in subsequent years.

To perform this task, we must display a high spirit of self-reliance, a high revolutionary-offensive spirit, tap the strength of collective ownership and carry out the three revolutions well. We must mobilize, to the very highest degree possible, the combined forces of the state and the people, the central level and the locality, fully implement the right of ownership of the various management levels, fully implement the procedures and principles regarding responsibility and discipline, bring about strong changes in thinking and organization and launch revolutionary movements of the masses. At the same time, we must make the most effective use possible of the assistance provided by the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries.

Of utmost importance is the need to make marked progress in 1984 and 1985 in developing the potentials that lie in labor, arable land and the various sectors and trades and in making full use of existing production capacity. Special importance must be attached to raising productivity, quality and efficiency, considering this to be the foremost standard in the evaluation of each economic activity.

We must continue to promote the comprehensive development of agricultural production, considering it to be the front of foremost importance. We must develop the potentials that lie in labor and arable land to the highest degree possible in order to firmly resolve the grain, food product and livestock production problems, very strongly develop industrial crop production, create sources of raw materials for industry and rapidly increase the output of export goods. Facts have clearly shown that our arable land, our labor and our tropical climate provide us with many conditions for strongly developing the production of industrial crops, especially annual industrial crops, considering industrial crops to be a source of fertilizer, petroleum products, pesticides and so forth for supporting agriculture itself. In 1984 and 1985, importance must be attached to such crops as peanuts, soybeans, sugarcane, tobacco, jute and so forth and such perennial crops as rubber, coffee, tea, coconuts and so forth. We must establish specialized farming areas for these crops and raise them as companion or overlapping catch crops throughout the country under the guideline "the state and the people working together, the central level and the locality working together, state-operated enterprises, collectives and families working together." At the same time, we must make preparations for developing the production of these crops on a large scale in the years ahead.

There must be stronger changes in the development of industry, small industry and the handicraft trades. Priority must be given to providing the conditions needed to rapidly increase the output of electricity and coal, especially with regard to practicing economy in their consumption, and a rational distribution policy must be enacted in order to make full use of our very limited sources of power. It is necessary to accelerate the production of fertilizer, pesticides and building materials and develop machine production, primarily for the purpose of supporting intensive cultivation and expanding the cultivation of grain and industrial crops. We must develop a number of

machine sectors that produce consumer goods, such as bicycles, sewing machines, electric fans, clocks and so forth. Full importance must be attached to the agricultural product processing industry and processing plants must be closely linked to crop production areas, especially within the district, where medium and small-scale processing plants must be established. Importance must also be attached to consumer goods production, especially the production of such essential goods as cloth, paper, sugar, milk and medicine, and export goods, such as tea, tobacco and wine. The development of industry demands that we reorganize production and make good use of existing production capacity, especially within state-operated industry; give attention to making investments in development in depth; take positive steps to create sources of supplies and raw materials in domestically produced agricultural products, forestry products and marine products and through the acceleration of exports; and expand the various forms of international cooperation so that we can import additional amounts of the raw materials and supplies we need.

Every effort must be made to fully utilize the capacity of existing production installations; at the same time, we must build those installations that are needed in heavy industry, such as power plants, machine works, iron and steel mills, electronics plants, chemical plants, installations producing building materials and so forth, in order to gradually establish a rational industrial-agricultural structure. Everything possible must be done to quickly start the construction of a number of heavy industrial projects of key significance in the process of socialist industrialization.

The large requirements involved in developing agriculture, industry, communications-transportation and so forth as well as carrying out cultural and social development demand that we increase our accumulated capital and make increased investments in capital construction utilizing the capital of both the central and local levels, the capital accumulated by enterprises themselves and contributions by the people. We must effectively combat the waste and loss of building materials, insure project quality and reduce building costs.

Distribution and circulation are a front of vital importance. By means of economic, administrative and educational measures, the state must gain control of goods and money, become the master of the market and prices and unify the management of the distribution and circulation of primary projects and goods. The state must exercise exclusive rights in the grain business. The state must plan the distribution of the supply of goods and organize planned trade between industry and agriculture, primarily through two-way contracts. Each source of revenues must be rapidly increased, especially revenues from the state-operated economy, in order to establish balance between revenues and necessary expenditures. Expenditures must be brought in line with our financial capabilities. We must gradually restore order within the field of prices. Through measures that are well coordinated, we must maintain the real income of cadres, manual workers, civil servants and the armed forces and meet some of the pressing needs in the daily lives of the people.

Export activities must be accelerated, especially the exportation of agricultural, forestry and marine products, in conjunction with expanding our service and tourist businesses, our activities among Vietnamese overseas and

so forth in order to attract foreign currency, considering this to be a factor of special importance in insuring that the balances contained within plans are maintained.

Economic and cultural development and the strengthening of the national defense system demand that we further improve our communications and transportation by continuing to reorganize transportation forces, developing river transportation, upgrading rail lines, expanding our ocean routes and providing stronger management in order to utilize existing capabilities well and eliminate negative phenomena.

Socialist transformation must be accelerated to insure its completion in the provinces of Nam Bo by the end of 1985. We must immediately remove the bourgeoisie from commerce. We must reorganize small merchants and shift a percentage of them to production and the services.

Cultural, scientific-technical, educational and public health activities must be developed in a manner consistent with the large demands involved in building the economy, strengthening the national defense system, molding the new man and establishing the new, civilized, wholesome and frugal lifestyle. We must struggle to rid ourselves of the decadent, reactionary slave culture and do away with bad customs, superstitions and social ills.

The large and pressing socio-economic tasks for the 2 years 1984 and 1985 can only be successfully performed by gaining a more thorough understanding of the line of the party and strongly improving the economic management and planning system. Of greatest importance is the need to tap the strength of the laboring people exercising collective ownership, tap the dynamism and creativity of millions of persons and launch truly intense and widespread revolutionary movements among the masses. The exercise of collective ownership is our greatest strength in accelerating transformation, construction and production, in promoting the practice of frugality, in restoring socialist order in distribution and circulation, in carrying out the scientific-technological revolution, establishing the new culture and molding the new man, in defending the fatherland, maintaining political security and maintaining social order and safety.

The new economic management and planning system must continue to be improved with a view toward providing incentive for workers and closely linking them to the final results of their work in terms of both responsibility and interests. The various management levels must exercise control together in production, in business and in organizing the daily lives of the people; they must maintain strict discipline, maintain the system of specific, strict responsibility and continuously expand the position of socialism in each field. The assignment of management responsibilities must be quickly completed so that the provincial (municipal) and district (ward) levels truly become the masters of production and business activities, most importantly in the plans and the management of economic, supply, finance, grain, export and other installations on the basis of maintaining centralized, unified management by the central level. It must be emphasized here that combating administrative bureaucracy and subsidization does not mean relaxing the centralized, unified management of the socialist economy by the central level.

We must continue to re-examine, amend and improve economic policies (such as those that pertain to prices, investments, financing, credit, exports-imports, procurements and so forth) so that policies play a stronger role in encouraging the development of production in accordance with the state plan. We must continue to improve the state-operated enterprise management system along the lines of increasing the independence that enterprises have in production and business and increasing their financial independence. We must improve and perfect the management system at small industry, handicraft and agricultural cooperatives. Importance must be attached to perfecting the system of product contracts with groups of laborers and individual laborers within agriculture.

The planning of the national economy must be carried out on the three basic levels: the central level, the local level (provinces, municipalities, districts and wards) and the basic level (enterprises, cooperatives and so forth). The requirement that we face in improving planning is to insure that each level, on the basis of the fundamental, common guidelines and objectives of the country, can take the initiative in developing its potentials and strengths in the best possible manner and utilize the four capabilities that exist in formulating their plans from the basic level upward and closely linking these plans to cost accounting and socialist business practices. The way that the implementation of plans is managed must be reorganized. There must be strict compliance with economic contract regulations.

The district is the basic unit of the system of large-scale socialist agricultural production. We must endeavor to bring about a marked change in all districts by the end of 1985, beginning in those districts that are of key importance from the perspective of grain and industrial crop production as well as the perspective of security and national defense.

Our entire party, all our people and our entire army are beginning 1984 having recorded new achievements, having gained new experience and having acquired new strength from the system of socialist collective ownership. May each organization of the party, each cadre and each party member gain a thorough understanding of the resolution of the 5th Plenum of the 5th Party Central Committee, display an exemplary, vanguard spirit and encourage the working people to enthusiastically engage in socialist emulation and win new victories for the cause of building and defending the socialist fatherland.

7809

CSO: 4210/19

SOME MATTERS PERTAINING TO MILITARY ART IN THE 1953-1954 WINTER-SPRING
OFFENSIVE AND THE DIEN BIEN PHU CAMPAIGN

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 84 pp 16-26

[Article by Hoang Van Thai on the 30th anniversary of the victory at Dien Bien Phu]

[Text] In the first 7 years of the war of resistance against France, our army and people defeated one strategic plan of the enemy after another, from the fait accompli plan (1945-1947) and the plan to surround the border area and broaden the scope of occupation in the midlands and lowlands of Bac Bo (1948-1950) to the plan to regain the strategic initiative (1951-1952).

In the eighth year, the war situation developed in a manner increasingly favorable to us. The three elements of our military forces had grown and always maintained the initiative. Very bright prospects for victory faced our people.

In late 1952, although the French colonialists were receiving two-thirds of the cost of the war in aid from the United States and despite the fact that their troop strength in Indochina had risen to 380,000, the French colonialists increasingly found themselves in a defensive posture, especially on the main battlefield, Bac Bo. In the face of the growth of our main force army, the enemy was forced to adopt a new form of defense and pulled their forces back to establish base complexes.

In the summer of 1953, in order to salvage the situation, Paris sent General Navarre to Indochina in a vain attempt to "find an honorable way out."

With the support of French and American authorities, Navarre set forth a large-scale strategic plan designed to regain the initiative and win a military victory of decisive significance in a relatively short amount of time.

Navarre's strategic plan consisted of two stages. First, in the winter and spring of 1953 and 1954, they would maintain their strategic defensive posture in the North and conduct a strategic offensive in the South while making every effort to build up the puppet army and establish a large and powerful mobile

army. In the dry season of 1954-1955, with the mobile force they had built and brought together, they were going to launch a strategic offensive on the Bac Bo battlefield, win a major military victory and force the opposition to negotiate under conditions favorable to France and the United States.

French and American ruling circles pinned high hopes on the Navarre plan. As its implementation progressed, they became increasingly optimistic and confident. Paris agreed to send additional troops to Indochina. Washington granted France nearly 4 million dollars and much military equipment in emergency aid and sent delegations of high ranking officers to supervise the plan's implementation. By 1954, as a result of the rapid increase in aid to France, the United States had assumed more than 78 percent of the cost of France's war in Indochina.

The Navarre plan, a major strategic plan, was carried out with greater determination than the policy of "supporting the war through war, using Viets to fight Viets" was applied in previous years.

Navarre began by building a strong strategic mobile force to use as the main tool in regaining the initiative. In the autumn and winter of 1953, he raised the total number of ground forces to 450,000 and established more than 80 strategic mobile battalions. While building mobile forces, Navarre conducted numerous sweep operations in a vain attempt to "pacify" areas under enemy control in order to plunder them for manpower and materiel. He also launched a major offensive against the Ninh Binh-Thanh Hoa border area in a vain attempt to thwart our plan for an offensive, which they had judged would be directed against the Red River Delta.

In view of the enemy's new strategy, our army and people were faced with the need to inflict a decisive defeat upon the Navarre plan, crush the will of aggression of the French colonialists and deal a powerful blow to the scheme of the U.S. imperialists to prolong and widen the war.

Looking back over the entire process of the implementation of the enemy's strategic plan and the process of the implementation of our strategy in the 1953-1954 winter-spring offensive, we see that the situation as it existed then was as follows:

First, while Navarre was making every effort to assemble his forces and build a powerful strategic mobile army, we launched a series of offensive campaigns in many strategically important directions in which the enemy was relatively vulnerable and destroyed an important contingent of their forces while forcing them to disperse their ground forces, thus thwarting the enemy in their effort to concentrate their forces and inflicting an important defeat upon the Navarre plan.

Secondly, Dien Bien Phu was not included in the initial operations plan of the enemy but, as a result of the activities of our forces, it gradually became the center of fighting under the Navarre plan. For us, as a result of the way that our formulation of strategy unfolded, Dien Bien Phu became the site of the decisive strategic battle that defeated the greatest military effort of the French imperialists and the U.S. interventionists.

The unique aspect of our art of war in the 1953-1954 winter-spring offensive, the pinnacle of which was the Dien Bien Phu campaign, was that our party established correct strategic guidelines and guided the application of campaign art and tactics in a manner consistent with the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy, consistent with the fighting skills of our troops at that time and created a strong position and strong forces in order to win a victory of decisive significance.

I. The Guidance of the Formulation of Strategy

Our party's correct guidance of the formulation of strategy in the 1953-1954 dry season was evident in the selection of the mountainous forests as the main strategic front in the autumn and winter of 1953, in the selection of the site of the decisive strategic battle once the enemy had occupied Dien Bien Phu and in mobilizing the forces of all the people to turn these strategies into real victory.

At the very start of 1953, during its 4th Plenum, the Party Central Committee, on the basis of deeply and scientifically analyzing the general war situation, established the guidelines for our strategy in the autumn and winter.

One characteristic of the war situation at the start of 1953 was the uneven development of our armed forces on the three battlefields of Bac Bo, Trung Bo and Nam Bo. In Bac Bo, the three different elements of our military forces were strong, especially our main force troops.⁽¹⁾ Meanwhile, in Trung Bo and Nam Bo, our forces were unevenly developed and main force units were developing slowly. This explains why the majority of the enemy's main force troops gradually became concentrated in Bac Bo and why the enemy was highly vulnerable on the other battlefields.

In Bac Bo, the enemy had concentrated 47 percent of their ground forces (130 of 284 battalions), which included 44 strategic mobile battalions, that is, 52 percent of their total mobile forces on the Indochina battlefield (44 of 84 battalions). The majority of these troops was concentrated in the lowlands; in the mountainous forests, the forces of the enemy were relatively weaker.

On the Bac Bo battlefield, the scene of the main encounter between our main force troops and the main force units of the enemy, our main force troops equalled on 69 percent of the main force troop strength of the enemy (90 versus 130 battalions), with the ratio between strategic mobile forces being 1:1.2 (44 enemy battalions to our 54 battalions). This comparison shows that we had not yet achieved military superiority on the main battlefield.

In view of this situation, the question that we faced in the autumn and winter of 1953 was whether to select the mountainous forests or the lowlands as the scene of the strategic offensive by our main force troops? Despite the objective need in the war of resistance at that point in time to launch large-scale battles in the lowlands, it was clear that, for the foreseeable future, the comparison of forces prevented us from achieving superiority in ground forces and fire power in an offensive campaign in the lowlands, which was where the enemy had concentrated their forces and was their "strong spot."

The experience of the campaigns in the midlands and lowlands in 1951 had proven that by concentrating our ground forces to a certain degree, we could only achieve absolute superiority for a short period of time. When the enemy sent in reinforcements and rapidly moved in additional mobile forces to deal with us, we found it very difficult to continue to develop our offensive. Meanwhile, on the battlefield in the mountainous forests, enemy forces were relatively dispersed and their ability to use artillery and air power as well as their ability to resupply and reinforce their units by air were very greatly limited. Moreover, the mountainous forests were a region in which we could establish and maintain a superiority of ground forces throughout an offensive campaign and afforded more favorable conditions for winning a victory of strategic significance.

On the basis of the situation described above and in order to thwart the enemy's attempt to concentrate their forces, President Ho, at the plenum of the Party Central Committee held in January, 1953, set the guidelines for our strategy in the autumn and winter as "'temporarily avoiding the strengths while attacking the weaknesses' of the enemy in order to disperse their forces, kill enemy forces and expand the liberated zone."(2) The plenum asserted: "In view of these strategic guidelines, our army must attack the enemy at those places where the enemy is vulnerable while conducting strong activities in areas behind enemy lines. Our army must prepare itself to attack the increasingly strong forces and bases of the enemy, be they in the mountains or the lowlands."(3)

On the basis of the strategic guidelines established by the Central Committee, the Military Commission adopted an autumn-winter combat plan that consisted primarily of the following:

- Selecting the northwest as the front on which the main strategic offensive would be conducted, with a view toward liberating Lai Chau and developing the offensive into upper Laos;

- Achieving closer coordination between operations on the Lao battlefield and operations in the northwest in order to annihilate the forces of the enemy, expand the liberated zone and force the enemy to disperse their main force units;

- Intensifying the political war, the proselyting of enemy soldiers and the guerrilla war in areas behind enemy lines. A contingent of main force troops would be used in decentralized operations designed to wipe out individual contingents of enemy forces and support the widespread development of activities within the enemy's rear area;

- Preparing the necessary forces and plans for defeating the enemy should they attack the liberated zone.

In phase I of the winter-spring offensive, in keeping with the combat plan outlined above and through a series of offensive campaigns on important strategic fronts on which the enemy was relatively weak, we destroyed an important contingent of enemy forces (more than 20,000 troops, including many well trained units), liberated many areas of strategic significance in the

northwest, the northern Central Highlands and Laos and forced the enemy to disperse their strategic mobile forces in many different directions.(4) The mobile forces of the enemy that were concentrated in the Red River Delta (only about 20 battalions were still there) were being torn apart to deal with the guerrilla war. The mobile forces of the enemy had become so decentralized that they could no longer fulfill the role of a mobile force.

Our operations during phase I of the winter-spring offensive began the defeat of Navarre's plan to concentrate his strategic mobile forces, rendered their strategic force, their strategic mobile units, ineffective just as they were being formed and put the enemy into a completely passive position.

Another important success of the party in its guidance of the formulation of strategy was the selection of the site of the decisive strategic battle and the primary strategic target following the enemy's occupation of Dien Bien Phu.

Having discovered that one of our main force units had moved its troops into the northwest, Navarre hastily landed a paratroop force on the Muong Thanh field in a vain attempt to prevent our troops from crossing into upper Laos. He subsequently decided to strengthen this force and build Dien Bien Phu into a strong base complex, into a "super Nasan," in an attempt to wipe out our main force troops on a battlefield that the French had selected and prepared. In his progression from avoiding pitched battles with our main force units on the Bac Bo battlefield during the 1953 dry season to having no choice but to send troops to Dien Bien Phu and engage in battle, from Dien Bien Phu at first not even being part of his plan to this battlefield becoming the center of his strategic plan, it was clear that Navarre had suffered a serious loss of strategic initiative.

Immediately after the enemy occupied Dien Bien Phu, we faced a question of strategic importance: should we assemble the majority of our main force units to attack Dien Bien Phu and destroy this base complex of the enemy or should we continue to surround and pin down the enemy forces there, thus making it possible for our army to continue killing the enemy on the other battlefields?

Analyzing the situation that existed then, the Political Bureau of our Party Central Committee saw that our army had to destroy the Dien Bien Phu base complex in order to open the way for our troops to develop their offensive, stimulate the development of the war of resistance, defeat the Navarre plan and thwart the plan of the French and American imperialists to prolong and widen the war.

We then established two principles, namely, that we must kill enemy forces and only attack when victory was assured; we weighed the specific conditions that existed regarding the enemy and ourselves in terms of ground forces and fire power, battlefield terrain, rear service and technical support and capabilities on the main battlefield and coordinating battlefields; we evaluated the strategic intentions of the enemy and the various tactical and technical measures that could be employed by them to realize their intentions, etc. All of these factors taken together formed the basis of our decision to select Dien Bien Phu as the scene of the decisive strategic battle.

On the basis of the specific comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy at that time and the new capabilities of both sides, we maintained that our army could indeed destroy the Dien Bien Phu base complex because:

1. The enemy forces there, although strong (many times stronger than those at the Nasan base complex), were isolated on the battlefield in the mountainous forests and were very far from their bases in the lowlands. The enemy's greatest weakness was that they had to rely solely upon airborne operations (that could be limited and interdicted by us) to reinforce and resupply their troops.

2. While the enemy was stronger than we in terms of technical equipment, combat in the terrain of the mountainous forests was more advantageous to us than combat in the terrain of the lowlands.

3. Our main force troops had gained new experience and made new advances in the tactics and techniques involved in attacking strong fortifications and were better able to attack base complexes. Our fire power had begun to be strengthened.

4. Although Dien Bien Phu was very far from the rear area, strategic transport lines had been partially prepared. Although rear service supply operations posed difficulties and although roads could be attacked by the enemy, our people and our army were capable of overcoming these difficulties and supporting the frontline.

5. With the victory of phase I of the winter-spring campaign, we managed to create an increasingly favorable strategic position for ourselves and the strategic mobile forces of the enemy had been seriously decentralized. Soon, with the further acceleration of operations on the coordinating battlefields, the enemy would be forced to spread their forces even more thinly to deal with us and we would be able to limit their ability to reinforce Dien Bien Phu to the lowest possible level.

Therefore, in late January, 1954, even though the base complex and the forces of the enemy were being strengthened with each passing day, our party still held to its decision to annihilate all enemy forces at Dien Bien Phu.

This was an important strategic decision, one that fully reflected the guidelines of "activism, initiative, mobility and flexibility" that was set forth by the Political Bureau at the September, 1953 plenum.

We had progressed from temporarily avoiding the strengths and attacking the weaknesses of the enemy and selecting areas of strategic importance in which the enemy was relatively vulnerable to conduct offensive campaigns during phase I of the winter-spring offensive to selecting Dien Bien Phu, the strongest enemy base complex, as the scene of the decisive strategic battle for which we would assemble our forces to annihilate the enemy.

Facts proved that the decision to select the battlefield in the mountainous forests as the front for the main strategic offensive and the subsequent

decision to select Dien Bien Phu as the scene of the decisive strategic battle were totally correct and wise decisions.

In the 1953-1954 winter-spring offensive, especially in the Dien Bien Phu campaign, our party, relying upon the forces of all the people, mobilized the tremendous moral and material strengths of the entire country while seeking and winning the widespread sympathy and support of the people of the world, thus creating a combined strength for turning its correct strategic decision into victorious reality on the battlefield.

The decision to agitate among the masses and carry out agrarian reform created a new revolutionary spirit in the rear area, one that had a direct impact upon our troops, the majority of whom were rural youths, as they faced the enemy day after day on the frontlines. The victory won in the rear area in the class struggle in the countryside provided even more moral and material strength with which to reinforce the frontlines.

The tens of thousands of fresh troops that augmented our forces on the battlefield, the more than 260,000 corvee laborers from the lowlands to the mountains, from the liberated zone to the occupied zone who worked more than 18 million mandays supporting the campaign, the more than 25,000 tons of rice that were sent to the front and so forth were eloquent proof of the forces mobilized by the rear area to support the frontlines.

General Navarre as well as many French and Western high ranking military officers and journalists would later confess that they failed to take into consideration the forces of an entire nation providing excellent rear service and resupply support of the troops on the front.

The combined strength that was employed in the winter-spring offensive and the Dien Bien Phu campaign was also manifested in the smooth coordination of operations between the main battlefield and coordinating battlefields, between our battlefield and battlefields of our friends, between the offensive blows by main force units on the front and the widespread activities of the three elements of our military forces in the areas behind enemy lines, between attacks to kill enemy forces and liberate land and the uprising movement to kill traitors, eliminate spies agitate among enemy soldiers and expand the guerrilla areas and guerrilla bases within enemy held territory.

The coordinated operations of the various battlefields behind enemy lines, especially in the Red River Delta, resulted in victories over the strategic mobile forces of Navarre and exacerbated the fatal weakness of the enemy, the need to resupply the complex of bases at Dien Bien Phu. Enemy forces were constantly being worn down and dispersed and more and more of their strategic transport equipment was being destroyed, especially along Route 5. Typical examples were the two raids on the Cat Bi and Gia Lam airfields, which destroyed nearly 80 enemy aircraft; the raid on the Nha Trang base, which set fire to and destroyed 3.7 million liters of gasoline; and the raid on Tan Son Nhat airport, during which hundreds of tons of bombs were exploded. The coordinating battlefields, especially the Red River Delta, helped to limit and eventually cut the enemy's resupply and reinforcement of the key Dien Bien Phu battlefield. As the enemy later acknowledged, the lifeline of the base

complex was choked at both ends, in the Red River Delta and in the skies over Muong Thanh.

Our combined strength was also evident in the high degree of coordination achieved in the struggles on the military, political and diplomatic fronts to win the sympathy and support of the people of the world, beginning with the people of the fraternal countries and the people of France, for our nation's just war of resistance.

The enemy themselves had to acknowledge that the statement made in November, 1953, by President Ho Chi Minh to a correspondent of EXPRESSEN Newspaper (Sweden) and the resolution of the foreign ministers meeting in Berlin on the opening of negotiations in Geneva on the Indochina issue were strong blows to the morale of the French expeditionary forces.

The victorious conclusion of the Dien Bien Phu campaign 1 day before the start of the Geneva Conference on Indochina represented perfect coordination between the battlefield and the conference table and provided our negotiators with timely, large and effective support.

Clearly, as a result of adopting the correct strategy, establishing precise strategic guidelines, correctly selecting the scene of the decisive strategic battle and knowing how to create a large combined strength, how to mobilize each factor of victory in the course of implementing this strategy, our party was able to lead our army and people in gradually depriving the enemy of the strategic initiative in one case after another and facing the enemy with one strategic surprise after another. The enemy was so surprised and so deprived of the initiative that even while they were confident in and pinned high hopes on their main strategic force, their mobile force, this "strategic fist" was being decentralized in many different directions even as it was being put together and centralized. The enemy was so surprised and so deprived of the initiative that while they were maintaining that our activities on the different strategic fronts had "reached a peak," that we had "run out of steam" and would not dare attack the Dien Bien Phu base complex and that they were thus free to continue the At Lang campaign (the attack on the Interzone 5 liberated zone), our forces launched the Dien Bien Phu campaign. The enemy was so taken by surprise that while they were confident in the "inviolability of the Nasan super base complex" and believed that Dien Bien Phu would be the "grinder that will crush the main force units of the Viet Minh should they dare to recklessly attack it," our forces destroyed one enemy base after another and ultimately destroyed the entire base complex.

II. The Application of Campaign Art and Tactical Methods

Establishing the correct strategic guidelines is a very important factor in winning victory in a war or on a decisive strategic front. However, strategic guidelines, no matter how precise they might be, are only a prerequisite, a potential. One other important matter that must be raised and correctly resolved in order to turn this potential into real victory is that of campaign art and tactical methods.

The matter of paramount importance in the Dien Bien Phu campaign was that we established the correct guidelines for the campaign itself.

On the basis of the actual situation that existed during the early period of the campaign, that is, immediately after enemy paratroops had landed, before their forces had been strengthened, before their defensive positions had been consolidated and while they were still relatively vulnerable, we advocated the strategy of "a quick attack, quick results": assembling all our forces, establishing coordination among the different branches, launching an offensive from many different directions, directly attacking the enemy at those places at which they were most vulnerable, cutting the base complex into individual contingents, destroying their most important contingents and then eliminating the remaining forces and completing the destruction of the base complex in the space of roughly 3 nights and 2 days. The Front Party Committee analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of this "quick attack, quick results" approach. The advantages were: our forces were in top condition; the fight would not last long and only tire our forces slightly; and no major obstacles would be encountered in resupplying our troops with food and ammunition. The disadvantages were that despite preparing them ideologically and tactically, despite providing them with better equipment, our forces still had no actual experience in attacking a base complex.

The process of preparation was also a process of continuing to closely observe the enemy situation and continuing to ponder our method of attack. On 25 January 1954, as our troops awaited the order to open fire, the Front Party Committee saw that the "quick attack, quick results" approach was no longer suitable and did not assure victory because:

First, the enemy situation had changed. Their two northern positions had been reinforced and developed into strong bases. The southern positions had been developed into a cluster of bases. To the west of the Muong Thanh airport, a number of new bases had appeared. The positions in the hills to the east had been strengthened and continued to be strongpoints that the enemy could use to prolong their defensive combat operations.

Secondly, our preparations, especially the positioning of artillery, involved demands that far exceeded initial projections. If we were to open fire when planned (the evening of 25 January), many difficulties would be encountered in preparing our artillery for combat. On the other hand, it was only through the work involved in putting our artillery into position that we realized something that had not been noticed before, namely, the problem of how manpower could be used to quickly move artillery to other positions when necessitated by combat. In addition, there were many other tactical and command problems that had not been resolved to the point where victory was assured, especially with regard to combat operations in the center of the base complex.

The Front Party Committee realized that attacking quickly and trying to win a quick victory in such a situation was not an approach that compiled with the Political Bureau's thinking of attacking when victory was assured; therefore, it decided to change the guideline to "attack when assured of victory and advance steadily."

The Front Party Committee realized that the "attack when assured of victory and advance steadily" approach would result in a longer campaign and pose many new difficulties and obstacles: the enemy would be able to strengthen their fortifications and reinforce their troops; our troops might be worn down and exhausted by a long campaign; and resupply operations, which were already difficult, would be made even more difficult.

However, the Front Party Committee maintained that the highest principle in a battle, especially in a decisive, strategic battle as important as the Dien Bien Phu campaign, was to be assured of victory. Every obstacle involved in observing this principle had to be overcome. No difficulty could be considered sufficient reason to reduce the requirement of being assured of victory.

This change in guidelines was entirely accurate and proved to be of decisive significance in the victory of the campaign.

However, to win victory, more than campaign guidelines are required. In view of the fact that our troops were only capable of launching a 1 night attack and destroying an enemy battalion within strong fortifications, we had to devise suitable methods of fighting that would enable our troops to vastly improve their capabilities, to fight for many days in a row and destroy dozens of well trained enemy battalions deployed in interconnected bases within a complex under circumstances in which our equipment had not been significantly improved. Therefore, various tactics of campaign significance were applied in order to limit the strengths and take full advantage of the weaknesses of the enemy, thus turning their large forces into small forces, their strong equipment into weak equipment.

1. Most important was the tactic of laying a campaign-scale siege and then destroying one battalion after another or a number of battalions within the base complex.

The ground forces of the enemy at Dien Bien Phu consisted of roughly 20 battalions of various types. During the entire campaign, our ground forces only outnumbered those of the enemy by a ratio of 1.8 to 1.

At the outset of the campaign, our forces established a campaign-scale siege on all fronts, with each division being put in charge of one specific front. We coordinated the operations of the various branches in each battle and destroyed one contingent after another of the enemy forces within each center of resistance. We then attacked and occupied individual bases in conjunction with organizing operations against enemy counter-attacks in order to hold the positions we had occupied and use them as a springboard for attacks to occupy other bases.

This method of fighting was suited to the capabilities of our army at that time. It insured our forces of victory in each battle and assured the eventual annihilation of all enemy forces within the base complex. It was a creative method of fighting, one that fully reflected the guideline of "being assured of victory and advancing steadily" but also met the requirement of

making leaps forward and destroying a large force of the enemy in an offensive campaign unprecedented in the 10 year history of our army.

After the two initial battles that "stripped away the shell" of the enemy in the North, we destroyed a number of bases in the East and then employed the tactic of gradual "encroachment" to destroy one gun emplacement, one bunker and one enemy position at a time. In this way, our troops limited the strengths of the enemy, their large troop strength and powerful equipment, forcing them to deal with us at one base or cluster of bases at a time and limiting the ability of their ground forces to support each other and their ability to launch counter-attacks to reoccupy the positions they lost.

2. The tactic of building offensive battle positions and laying siege resulted in a multi-layer, multi-row network of combat trenches that increasingly strangled enemy forces.

In previous years, in order to destroy an independent enemy battalion within strong fortifications, it was the experience of our troops to establish a battle position from which they could launch an attack against an individual detachment of enemy troops and then use the cover of darkness to conclude the battle in one night. Faced with the need to fight for many days and destroy a large force of the enemy on the flat terrain of the Muong Thanh field and within range of the enemy's artillery and air force, the problem arose of determining how our troops could approach the enemy and fight continuously both day and night.

By means of the tactic of building a network of offensive battle positions and constantly tightening the siege around each enemy base, our forces limited the effectiveness of enemy fire power to the lowest possible level, created the conditions needed to hold their positions, fight continuously and destroy one enemy position after another and eventually destroyed the entire base complex in a campaign that lasted 55 days and nights.

By using the network of combat trenches that moved closer to the enemy each day, our troops were able to engage in a wide variety of operations, such as seizing ground by degrees, sniper fire and so forth, thus putting the enemy into a constant state of panic and delivering a strong blow against their fundamental weakness, their poor fighting morale.

As the enemy later acknowledged, although they did everything possible, they could not stop the spread of our combat trenches; their complex of bases was surrounded by another "complex of bases" that constantly tightened the noose around their necks like a spider weaving a dense web to catch an insect. Not one of the escape plans proposed by the French command staffs in Hanoi and Saigon could be carried out.

3. Every conceivable measure was employed to cut the enemy's reinforcement and resupply lines and take full advantage of their weakness as an isolated base complex that was totally dependent upon an airlift for resupply and reinforcement.

On the basis of their offensive battle positions and increasingly tight encirclement of the enemy, our troops used their various types of fire power to control the enemy's airfield and ultimately managed to isolate and occupy the airfield by moving forward by degrees. The air life became less of a threat and was ultimately totally paralyzed. That which the enemy at first thought was a strength and an advantage over us, that is, their rear service support and resupply capabilities, became their fatal weakness.

Having lost the airfield, the enemy was forced to keep their base complex alive by parachute. However, the amount of ground and the air space controlled by the enemy were continuously being reduced and the scope of operation of their aircraft was limited, thus forcing them to drop their parachutes at night from high altitudes in order to avoid anti-aircraft artillery. Many of the resupply parachutes fell outside the area controlled by the enemy. Our forces launched a movement to collect these parachutes in order to meet a portion of our combat needs, especially our need for artillery shells, but primarily to completely sever the enemy's very thin resupply lines.

As they later confessed, the tightening of the noose of combat trenches together with the interdiction of their airlift caused their remaining positions to be blockaded and isolated, to suffocate from the shortage of ammunition and food, especially the lack of water. The morale of enemy soldiers rapidly declined in the face of their serious situation, which they called "life in hell." In the end, 10,000 enemy survivors could endure no longer and were forced to surrender when our forces launched their general offensive.

As regards reinforcements, because their air space and drop zone had been reduced by our growing network of trenches, they were unable to land fresh troops by parachute because they had to be dropped at night and from high altitudes. Although they were still rounding up so called "volunteer" paratroops and requested increasingly large numbers of fresh troops, their ability to reinforce their troops by air became increasingly limited as the end of the battle neared and they ultimately stopped trying altogether.

All of the facts presented above show that the military art that our party applied in the 1953-1954 winter-spring offensive and the Dien Bien Phu campaign was a whole and complete entity consisting of strategy, campaign art and tactics. These three factors were organically related to one another. On the basis of maintaining the initiative and accurately determining where our strategic offensive would occur, we correctly applied campaign art, established correct campaign guidelines and employed tactics that were consistent with the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy, consistent with our fighting and command skills. Our correct strategic guidelines made it possible to employ campaign art and tactics of campaign significance. Conversely, the correctness of our campaign guidelines and the leap forward that we made in tactics insured that our precise strategy would be turned into victory.

The thinking to which we adhered throughout the process of applying our

military art in the winter-spring offensive and the Dien Bien Phu campaign was the thinking of taking the initiative and being on the offensive, from launching continuous attacks in those strategic areas in which the enemy was relatively weak and vulnerable to taking the initiative in selecting the place at which the enemy was strongest as the scene of the decisive strategic battle, which we did in the spirit of being determined to destroy the enemy, an enemy who had large forces, strong fire power and strong fortifications, being determined to thwart the enemy's greatest defensive effort, that is, drawing their forces back and establishing a base complex.

By fully adhering to the thinking of taking the initiative and being on the offensive, by adhering to the principles of annihilating the enemy and attacking only when victory was assured, our party provided creative guidance that resulted in methods of fighting that were correct from the perspective of the campaign itself and the tactics employed in it. This enabled our army to display, to a high degree, man's mastery over technical weapons.

The army's spirit of determination to fight and win was highly tapped on the basis of a precise strategy, the selection of correct methods of fighting and actual command capabilities. This spirit enabled our army to make a leap forward in fighting skills, in its ability to destroy the largest and the strategically most important enemy force in the entire resistance against France.

FOOTNOTES

1. On the main battlefield in Bac Bo, we had 90 of our 110 main force battalions, which included 54 mobile battalions belonging to the six strategic reserve divisions.
2. The resolution of the 4th Plenum of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party (25-30 January 1953), "Military Documents of the Party," Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1977, Volume 3, p 380.
3. Ibid.
4. The Red River Delta, Dien Bien Phu, Xeno, Pakse, Pleiku, the southern Central Highlands, Luang Prabang and Muang Xai.

7809

CSO: 4210/19

SOME MATTERS REGARDING DISTRIBUTION AND CIRCULATION

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 84 pp 27-33

[Article by Tran Ho]

[Text] Since the issuance of Resolution 26 of the Political Bureau of the 4th Party Central Committee, especially since the 5th Party Congress, gradual improvements have been made in distribution and circulation. A number of specific policies that have been promulgated concerning distribution and circulation have helped to improve the management system, put goods under state control through procurements, especially the procurement of grain and other agricultural products, and stimulate the development of both the production and circulation of goods.

In 1983, numerous business organizations, displaying self-reliance, developed many sources of goods. The forces of socialist commerce in many provinces and municipalities were strengthened in a number of areas. Progress was made in procuring goods for the state compared to 1982.

However, besides the strongpoints mentioned above, there is one shortcoming on our part that stands out: our failure to fully adhere to the viewpoint concerning the struggle between socialism and capitalism in the period of transition. This is evident in the relaxation of the dictatorship of the proletariat that has occurred in many different fields, especially in distribution and circulation; in the lack of continuity in the socialist transformation of private industry and commerce; and in the lax management of the market that has allowed the bourgeoisie to regain strength and develop in both the South and the North, has allowed private commerce to develop unorganized businesses. During the past several years, private commerce has grown very quickly, especially in the municipalities, cities and towns.

At present, market prices are changing strongly and the management of prices by the state is largely ineffective. Whereas the system of state directed procurement prices is actually only applied to procurements made under obligations, within the system of retail consumer goods prices, only the supply prices of rationed goods and a number of non-rationed products remain stable, which is due to the state's policy of compensating for losses. In

1983, the index of retail prices on the social market increased many times compared to previous years.

The situation described above has led to increasing profiteering and smuggling. The budget deficit has increased and real wages have declined despite many recent efforts by the state to maintain and stabilize the living standard of manual workers and civil servants. Negative phenomena and disorder in distribution and circulation have been and are having an adverse effect upon production and the various areas of the life of society.

We are in the initial stage of the period of transition to socialism and our economy still consists of many different segments. We are in the process of advancing from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production and although the state-operated economy occupies the dominant position, it is not strong. The bourgeoisie is still active in businesses of many different kinds. They control material bases and business assets: money, goods and, in particular, "hidden" assets, such as gold, diamonds, foreign currency and so forth. The networks of illegal bourgeois businesses in merchandise and currency have not been wiped out, rather, many different forms of these businesses are still developing and they still maintain ties with the world market.

Following the total liberation of the South, a unified, nationwide market was established and the economic, trade, monetary, market and other relations between the South and the North developed, thus creating favorable conditions for restoring and developing our country's economy following the long and savage war. However, these same conditions enabled the newly emerged bourgeoisie in the North to link up with the bourgeoisie in the South and spread their activities throughout the domestic market. Many bourgeoisie, instead of operating businesses in industry, are competing against one another in many different forms of businesses in commerce and the services. They do business over long distances as well as short distances and sell all types of goods, even goods that are under the exclusive management of the state, both wholesale and retail. They have established ties with the large network of small merchants in order to serve as the link between small producers in agriculture, small industry and the handicraft trades and consumers in the procurement and marketing of goods. They steal many supplies and goods from the state through a number of degenerate, deviant elements among cadres and personnel at production and business units. They have also maintained and developed smuggling routes from foreign countries, through which they are supported by the ethnic Chinese compradore bourgeoisie in the countries of Southeast Asia, by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and by the U.S. imperialists.

The bourgeoisie is constantly engaged in profiteering and smuggling, ignores the law on business licenses and evades taxes. At the same time, they look for every possible way to artificially raise prices on the market. They struggle against the organizations of the state-operated economy and our management agencies in many different ways in order to maintain and develop their capitalist style of operation. As a result, the distribution-circulation front is the focal point of the struggle between socialism and capitalism, a

struggle that is now a very sharp and decisive struggle, especially on the market in the South.

In the recent past, many of us have failed to notice that this complex class struggle even exists and at a time when the enemy is waging a wide-ranging war of sabotage against our country, this struggle has also become closely associated with the struggle between ourselves and the enemy.

To correct the present disorder in distribution and circulation, we must take the following several steps:

1. Strongly developing socialist commerce.

In order to fulfill our task in the circulation of goods, meet the daily needs of the people, wage a victorious struggle against private commerce and become the masters of the market, socialist commerce must be strongly developed through policies and business guidelines that lie within the orb of socialism. Recently, besides the several achievements that have been recorded in this field, there have also been some ideas and actions that are incorrect.

Socialist commerce, which consists of state-operated commerce and cooperative commerce, has been developing very slowly. This is seen in the fact that socialist commerce once dominated a number of businesses, such as the public food and beverage business, the food products business, the services and so forth but has recently allowed private commerce to gradually make inroads in these sectors. In the period of transition, socialist commerce must gradually achieve control over more and more of the market in order to ultimately control the entire social market. However, in the recent past, the percentage of the social market controlled by the organized market has declined in both the North and the South while the percentage controlled by the free market has constantly increased: from 20 percent in 1980 to 30 percent in 1981, 40 percent in 1982 and even higher in 1983.

On the other hand, there is a tendency to view socialist commerce as a profit making organization and, as a result, orient it toward activities based on the market. This is a mistake that must be corrected. While developing the system of socialist commerce organizations, one phenomenon deserving of attention has occurred: the specialized division of labor within the circulation of goods has become divorced from the division of labor in production, which is still at a very low level. Although the circulation of goods has a major impact upon production, especially in the process of advancing from small-scale production and has a decisive impact upon the development of production at certain times, within certain areas and with regard to certain products, in theory as well as practice, it is still production that is the decisive factor in the circulation of goods and the level of specialization in circulation is still determined by the level of development of production. It is correct for us to attach importance to circulation, especially under the circumstances of advancing from small-scale production, but this does not permit us to cause circulation to speed ahead like "a horse at full gallop" in a manner that far exceeds the level of development of production.

Due to their incorrect understanding of this, some sectors have organized too many central level corporations, corporations that are divorced from the division of labor within production. Some of the corporations that have been established are not doing business in the products for which they were established. Among these corporations, there is competition for business products and even some state-operated corporations have been operating in a manner contrary to the socialist viewpoint concerning business and socialist business guidelines. The consequences of this situation have helped to create additional disorder in the circulation of goods and prices on the market. Actually, when a new business organization is brought into existence when its establishment is not necessitated by objective requirements, it cannot remain in existence for very long because the returns from and the quality of its business operations will not satisfy the desires of overly subjective persons engaged in economic work. However, although it is not difficult to establish a corporation, it not a simple matter to alter or disband one, even though everyone might agree that this is the reasonable course to take, consequently, such organizations remain in existence and the resulting waste is considerable.

In conjunction with strongly developing state-operated commerce, it is necessary to develop the marketing cooperatives in a widespread manner to competently support state-operated commerce in the circulation of goods and the management of the market, especially the market in the countryside. At the same time, in order to correct the problem of high interest loans and encourage investments in the development of production, credit cooperatives must be strongly developed in both the countryside and the cities. At present, more than a few wealthy persons who control much money are making loans at rather high interest rates.

2. Accelerating socialist transformation and strengthening the management of the market.

We must properly carry out the socialist transformation of the non-socialist segments of the economy in the South, continue the transformation of the increasing numbers of newly emerged bourgeoisie and small merchants in the North and continuously strengthen and improve socialist production relations. We must prohibit every act of profiteering, hoarding, the granting of high interest loans, the manufacture of fake goods and the monopolization of the market by the bourgeoisie and must support this effort through strict management. In conjunction with constantly strengthening and developing the forces of state-operated commerce and cooperative commerce, we must remove the bourgeoisie from commerce.

As regards those small-scale producers who are operating unorganized businesses, effective measures must be taken to thwart their spontaneous, capitalist tendencies. Economic management agencies have not been giving appropriate attention to this matter in the recent past. Small-scale producers earn their livings through their own labor; therefore, they readily follow the path of socialism and join the working class in advancing to socialism. On the other hand, because their production is also based on private ownership of the instruments of production, they are spontaneous and capitalist by nature. Because, as Lenin said: "Every hour of every day,

small-scale production breeds capitalism and bourgeoisie in a spontaneous manner and on a large scale."(1) In recent years, it is the bourgeoisie that has won over small-scale producers, especially small merchants, and used them as agents in their business network in order to achieve their own objectives.

Clearly, in a country of small farmers such as ours, the stratum of small-scale producers is very large and their spontaneous forces are very widespread. Although the nature and extent of their businesses differ from those of the bourgeoisie, their production is still ungoverned and they, too, undermine compliance with the laws of the state governing economic management.

Recently, the thinking of the petty bourgeoisie has made significant inroads among some cadres and personnel within the state apparatus. Some agencies and enterprises of the state, despite the fact that it is not their function to operate a business in commerce, have organized sales operations in order to earn money through the differences in the prices of goods. In 1982, the majority of the imported supplies and goods of the local export-import corporations, instead of being distributed on a priority basis to state-operated production installations, were sold at high prices to "cooperative teams" in production or to private merchants. If we also include the tens of billions of dong worth of goods imported from foreign countries by many legal and illegal means, the quantity of industrial goods that find their way into the hands of established bourgeoisie and newly emerged bourgeoisie is considerable. Negative phenomena at production and business installations, especially within the various commerce sectors, are still rather widespread. In addition, some degenerate and deviant cadres and personnel within the state apparatus whose allegiance has been bought by the bourgeoisie have been conspiring with and supporting them in their theft of property and goods from the state. This situation has made distribution and circulation even more disorderly and further complicated the management of the market. At present, it can be said "that the millions of tentacles of the monster that is the petty bourgeoisie are forcing their way into some strata of the working class, that profiteering, not exclusive management by the state, is penetrating to the very roots of our country's socio-economic life."(2)

By nature, private commerce is always associated with earning high profits through profiteering and price gouging; even small merchants exhibit this trait, although to a different degree than the bourgeoisie in commerce. Therefore, the long-range guideline of socialist commerce is to make continuous inroads and eventually dominate the entire social market.

At present, we must transform and reorganize small merchants in many different forms of organization, utilize some of them as procurement or retail sales agents, select some for the socialist commerce network and gradually shift the majority of them who are not necessary to jobs in production.

3. Strengthening our control of goods.

This is the number one task of the commerce sectors because, without controlling goods, we lack the material base needed to stabilize the market and stabilize prices. The key to price stabilization at this point in time is

for us to control an abundance of goods and sell them widely in order to eliminate the unnecessary scarcities that exist now.

To accomplish this, goods must be brought under the control of the state. The products of the state-operated enterprises (which include the central enterprises and local enterprises within each field of industry, agriculture, forestry and fishing and both the enterprises that receive all their supplies from the state or must acquire some on their own...) are owned by all the people and are controlled and distributed by the state. Of course, there is, depending upon the product, a division of responsibilities between the central level and the local level in the distribution of goods in accordance with the plan.

In subcontracting work, there must be full compliance with strict management regulations; material consumption ceilings and prices must not be arbitrarily established in order to avoid disrupting the system of directed wholesale prices of the state. Many enterprises have been using equipment, machinery, energy and primary raw materials of the state and only procuring a small portion of their supplies and materials on the outside; however, when selling their products, they demand a high price, one roughly equal to the market price. This is unreasonable.

As regards the products of small industry and the handicraft trades within the collective and private economic sectors, all production subcontracting plans are managed by the local government on a unified, territory-wide basis. All material consumption ceilings and prices must be based on the general ceiling standards of the central level in the regulations governing the division of management responsibilities. All subcontracted products are to be concentrated in the hands of the state (the central and local levels) by delivering them to state-operated commerce units. Those products produced by cooperatives or handicraftsmen using their own raw materials must also be controlled by the local government and can be given priority for sale to state-operated economic organizations under economic contracts.

Only by controlling industrial goods can the state establish the conditions and means needed to control agricultural commodities, because, we procure agricultural products primarily through two-way economic contracts and farmers wish to sell their products in order to purchase industrial goods at reasonable prices. If the state does not have enough industrial goods to sell under contracts, farmers are less enthusiastic about selling agricultural products to the state. Therefore, the more cloth, household utensils, building materials, chemical fertilizer and so forth that the state has, the more agricultural products farmers will sell to the state in order to purchase these items.

In the recent past, although it has procured many more agricultural, food, marine and forestry products than before, the state has only been able to control about 50 percent of the total quantity produced. The majority of commodities is procured not through two-way contracts, but by state-operated commerce directly trading a number of different types of goods for them or procuring them at prices roughly equal to prices on the market. Therefore, the decisive factor in controlling many agricultural products at directed

prices through two-way contracts is the need for the state to have enough industrial goods, which include consumer goods, building materials and instruments of production, to have a good impact upon the lives of farmers, upon the development of agriculture.

At present, the state is only controlling about 85 percent of the industrial consumer goods produced by central state-operated enterprises, 65 percent of the products of local state-operated industry and 16.6 percent of the products of small industry and the handicraft trades. Consequently, the procurement of agricultural products under two-way contracts is still not a smooth running operation.

There must be unified, nationwide compliance with the policy on selling grain to the state under stable obligations through two-way contracts in which procurements are closely linked to sales and are made at directed prices. We must do away with the so called "negotiated prices," which are essentially an effort to keep pace with free market prices. For grain procured over and above obligations and contracts, the state should pay incentive prices based on reasonable production costs and an appropriate profit margin, not try to keep pace with market prices that are under the many negative influences of private merchants.

We should immediately stop the sale of supplies and goods at high prices in order to procure paddy at high prices. In recent years, facts have proven that this course causes prices to soar. It is detrimental to both the state and farmers and only serves to provide speculators with large profits.

4. Controlling money, putting the sources of financial capital under state control and eventually eliminating the deficit and balancing the budget.

We must reorganize the system of state-operated revenues and increase the revenue sources of the budget from the state-operated economy on the basis of reorganizing production and making economical use of labor, capital and materials. Appropriate contributions must be mobilized among the collective and private economies, especially among farmers in those areas that produce many agricultural products.

State-operated economic units must reorganize and improve their accounting procedures, formulate production and financial plans, strictly adhere to enterprise financial procedures and fulfill their obligation to deliver products to the state. We must promptly deal with those enterprises that operate at a loss and resolve the problem of prolonged operating losses resulting from poor management and the failure to reorganize production.

We must improve the assignment of budget management responsibilities to the localities to insure that the various levels of government are able to take the initiative in formulating and implementing the budget revenue and expenditure plans for their locality with a view toward carrying out economic and cultural development within the locality on the basis of maintaining the continuity of the state financial system. We must oppose the tendency to decentralize the sources of capital of the state and oppose every manifestation of partialism and localism that harms the state budget.

The state bank must make greater use of credit in both the mobilization and the utilization of capital and meet the needs for capital in developing production and business, primarily within the socialist economy. We must broaden the scope of our regulation and control of the circulation of money and make changes to the discipline involved in the handling of cash in the economic activities of the state-operated economic sector and agencies of the state. We must not allow business units to arbitrarily maintain cash funds and make "expenditures" that exceed permissible limits. We must improve the handling of revenues and expenditures, improve the way payments are made and improve the use of credit in order to promptly meet the legitimate needs of production and business installations.

5. Managing prices well.

At present, the bourgeoisie is looking for every way to raise the prices of goods and is taking advantage of loopholes in the state's management of prices to intensify their exploitation of consumers.

The recent price adjustments made by the state were totally correct and necessary. However, we are still making mistakes in pricing: we have proceeded without caution and hastily set unsuitable prices for some products, failed to strictly adhere to established prices and even committed some shortcomings and mistakes in price policy. For a long time, we maintained fixed prices and stated that our prices were virtually "stable" even though production costs, labor productivity and the purchasing power of the dong had changed; when this shortcoming was criticized, the shortcoming mentioned above occurred. This has adversely affected the struggle against private merchants in the management of the market, adversely affected the process of social reproduction and the standard of living of the laboring people, especially wage earners.

In the adjustment of prices, we should begin by establishing the most reasonable enterprise and industrial wholesale prices possible because they are the foundation of cost accounting at state-operated enterprises and are the starting point in the establishment of prices within commerce, the establishment of the prices of consumer goods. As long as we fail to correctly define enterprise wholesale prices, we will, in actuality, fail to implement cost accounting in the true meaning of the term.

As regards the functions and tasks of prices, we should not over exaggerate what prices can accomplish or expect them to do things that they cannot, such as expecting that prices can balance the budget or expecting the implementation of a "one price policy" to combat the negative phenomena within the economy at this time.

Reasonable prices have a good impact upon the effort to balance our finances, upon the effort to oppose negative phenomena; however, financial balance has its origin in an increase in the gross social product and national income while negative phenomena have their origins in the capitalist business activities of the bourgeoisie and some persons emerging from the strata of small-scale producers, not in prices. Recent facts have proven that we cannot

simply use prices to resolve economic difficulties. The correct management of prices does, of course, help to curb the negative phenomena within society.

Distribution and circulation are a field in which we face many problems related to production and the daily lives of the people. We must firmly adhere to the viewpoint of the party as set forth in the resolutions of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Party Plenums, perform the jobs described above well and attach very much importance to developing socialist commerce and strengthening our management of the market because these are the central elements in distribution and circulation, are the leading elements in the struggle to resolve the question "who triumphs over whom" on the economic front at this time.

FOOTNOTES

1. V.I. Lenin: "Complete Works," Progress Publishing House, Moscow, Volume 41, p 47.
2. Ibid., Volume 32, p 430.

7809
CSO:4210/19

A PINNACLE OF GREAT VICTORY

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 84 pp 34-37 and 55

[Article by Thanh Tin commemorating the 5th anniversary of the victory over the aggression of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists (1979-1984)]

[Text] In launching a war of aggression against our country, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists brought upon themselves a heavy and shameful military, political and diplomatic defeat. The victory over the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists was a highpoint in the overall victory that has been won by our nation, our people. Fully 5 years have passed since the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists unleashed their war of aggression against our country. Five years provide sufficient perspective for us to more clearly see the defeat of the enemy and the magnitude of the historic victory won by our people and army in the new period of the revolution.

All the Water in the South China Sea Cannot Wash Away This Stain

The Chinese expansionists and hegemonists made a reckless move when they sent some 600,000 troops to commit outright aggression against the northern border provinces of our country. Displaying all the belligerence and arrogance of big-country nationalism, they subjectively thought that once they took action, our people would have no choice but to kneel in submission. They also gloated that with the "notable victory"(!) of the great Chinese army, the remnants of Pol Pot's forces in Kampuchea would surely be able to reverse the situation, the bloody rule of the genocidal clique could be restored and they could bring Kampuchea back under their control. However, developments on the battlefield went completely counter to their calculations. Large contingents of their army were routed and annihilated. The local troops and people of the ethnic areas along our border captured or persuaded to surrender a rather large number of Chinese soldiers in all branches of their forces: infantry, artillery, tank, communications, engineers and so forth. Those who escaped death had to flee in disgrace, leaving behind many weapons and much equipment. The towering crimes that the Chinese aggressor army committed by razing villages, looting, murdering people, primarily elderly people, women and children, destroying economic installations (factories, bridges, roads, farms, stations, mines and so forth) and other facilities (hospitals, schools, child care centers, streets, buildings, gardens and so forth) left behind a very

large stain. This stain is indelibly imprinted on the cruel, vile face of the Chinese expansionists. They, themselves, exposed their reactionary, evil nature to the world. They betrayed socialism and destroyed the accomplishments recorded by the Chinese people in their socialist revolution. They proclaim themselves to be "socialist," but a socialist country would never send its forces to commit aggression against another socialist country, especially when that other country is socialist Vietnam, a country that has continuously been the target of imperialist aggression and has struggled bravely against imperialism, especially when that country is heroic Vietnam, the country that symbolizes a tenacious, unyielding will, upholds the truth of our times that "there is nothing more precious than independence and freedom" and has the praise and respect of progressive mankind. In unleashing their war of aggression against Vietnam, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists sullied the honor and self-respect of the Chinese people, a people who have always cherished the friendship between China and Vietnam and always displayed a love of justice. The Beijing expansionists have resorted to every available means of slander and distortion. Their mass media have been operating at full tilt to deceive the people and they have even used poems, theatrical art and movies to defend their aggression but the Chinese people have not given their support of that filthy war. This is a massive stain in the modern history of China, one that the Beijing expansionists created. It brings discredit upon the entire process of the Chinese people's staunch revolutionary struggle.

The history of the Chinese liberation army is the long and glorious history of an army born of the people, an army that fought for the people against reactionary and imperialist powers to liberate the land of China. In early 1979, this history was discredited by the expansionists and hegemonists in the Celestial Palace. On their orders, some 600,000 Chinese troops set about committing barbarous crimes reminiscent of the imperialists and fascists, thus trampling upon the "eight bests" banner, upon the honor of an army with a tradition of struggling for the nation's just cause. This is another indelible stain, one that caused legitimate indignation among the mass of cadres and soldiers of the Chinese army as well as among the mass of Chinese people, a people who have always loved justice and reason.

Whose Lesson Is It to Learn?

Five years ago, the authorities in the Celestial Palace clamored at great length about "teaching Vietnam a lesson" when sending their troops to tear up our country. Actually, we gained a deeper understanding of a lesson that we had already learned. It is that we must be highly vigilant, must be vigilant from early on, must alertly, promptly and fully recognize the reactionary and treacherous mentality of those who babble about being revolutionaries, being socialists, about possessing the noble proletarian international spirit but who actually harbor the most virulent of expansionist ambitions and are the worst kind of opponents of Marxism-Leninism, socialism and the national liberation movement.

As for themselves, could it be that the authorities in the Celestial Palace have yet to learn the most vital and bitter lessons?

They are lessons that must be remembered for a lifetime. One lesson is that to lay one hand on Vietnam, to slander Vietnam, to use the force of naked aggression against Vietnam is to court shameful defeat. This is as true today as it was 1,000 years ago. Because, the nation of Vietnam, the people of Vietnam always live an honest and pure life, always brandish the banner of patriotism and friendship with other nations and always live and fight under the noble ideal: there is nothing more precious than independence and freedom. Today, with the Communist Party of Vietnam leading them, this nation, these people are loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to scientific socialism, to proletarian internationalism. To lay a hand upon Vietnam, to oppose Vietnam is to collide with the most precious spiritual values of history and our times, to collide with an unyielding will and strength that have already met a long and hard challenge and will only bring tragic defeat upon aggressors.

There is also the lesson that to commit a crime against Vietnam, against a nation that had endured untold sacrifice and hardship, a nation that fought tenaciously to liberate itself, a nation that loves independence and peace more than any other, to commit a crime against such a nation is to be immediately cursed and condemned by all revolutionary and progressive forces in the world. After committing aggression against Vietnam, the international prestige that the Chinese authorities worked hard to build during the past several decades rapidly declined. They abandoned their old friends in order to take up with new chums, the imperialists and reactionaries. When they brazenly attacked Vietnam, they openly and truly went over to the side of the sinister reactionary forces of the modern age and revealed their ugly, aggressive nature so fully that it cannot be concealed or explained away. It was an action that caused very large and permanent political and diplomatic damage for which nothing can compensate. There is a lesson to be learned here about causing serious cracks and divisions within their own ranks, especially in view of the protest, criticism, denunciation and opposition by the majority of the Chinese people against their reactionary, aggressive policy toward Vietnam. They have used their psychological warfare apparatus to slander Vietnam and have compelled the people of China to participate in anti-Vietnam meetings and demonstrations. They have even sent some of the persons who committed the most crimes against the Vietnamese in the war of aggression against Vietnam to deliver reports at a number of places. However, they can never generate true opposition to Vietnam among the mass of Chinese people. All of these attempts at deception have fallen on deaf ears if not despised by the people of their own country.

Five years have passed and if the war of aggression of the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists truly taught any appropriate lessons, they were the profound and useful, the bitter and shameful lessons that the reactionaries within Beijing ruling circles must ponder and remember for the rest of their lives!

A Thin Garment Hides No One From the Eyes of the World

Although the authorities in the Celestial Palace dare not publicly admit that they have learned any of the above lessons, they have, in their hearts,

learned them to some extent. As a result, they have made changes and adjustments to their policies and measures.

They are putting on makeup and a diplomatic smile everywhere they go. They speak at great length about their good will, about the traditional friendship between China and Vietnam. They are holding anti-Israeli reactionary meetings and pretending to support the liberation of the Arab nations. They are pursuing a "cool" policy toward a number of socialist countries that they once did not recognize as socialists while still vigorously opposing the Soviet Union, the citadel of the revolution and world peace. They are trying to win over a number of communist parties that they once called "revisionist parties." They admit to having made mistakes in the past and say that they are now rectifying them!

However, a thin garment conceals no one from the eyes of the people, especially when the people are the vast international communist movement, which has experienced many challenges, are the national liberation movement, which has been tempered in the long struggle against imperialism and colonialism, are the progressive people of the world, who have grown and matured. How can they conceal their evil ambition to sabotage Vietnam, to "bleed Vietnam," to conquer Vietnam through the very insidious and cunning wide-ranging war of sabotage that continues day after day? How can they explain away their obstinate refusal to sit down at the negotiating table to resolve issues with Vietnam in order to eventually normalize relations between the two countries, as Vietnam has steadfastly proposed in the spirit of truly valuing our friendship with the people of China? How can they conceal their collaboration with the U.S. imperialists, a very dangerous political, military, economic and diplomatic collaboration to oppose the forces of revolution and progress on this planet? The smiles of the representatives of the Beijing authorities in Washington and Tokyo are not the smiles of good social relations, but the smiles of collusion and conspiracy, of siding with and supporting one another in criminal schemes against peace, against each revolutionary and progressive trend of our times.

Radiant Vietnam

At this time 5 years ago, our entire nation, our entire country seethed with the spirit of fighting the Chinese aggressor army.

They were truly remarkable moments! Despite several decades of hardship and sacrifice in the fight against the imperialists and although they faced large difficulties in their daily lives, the people of our entire country arose as one, arose with pride, without the least fear of the big country aggressors, without the least fear of bloodshed and with even less fear of the enemy's "human wave" tactic.

A movement to join the army and take up arms in the fight spread throughout the country. Youths in all provinces and municipalities, even young women and teenagers, eagerly volunteered to go to the frontlines to drive off the Chinese aggressors. The unyielding will and heroic character of the entire nation in the face of the aggressors were immediately made evident in our daily work and life.

Our people and army continue to write brilliant pages in the nation's glorious history of resistance against foreign aggression: after completely defeating the Japanese fascists, the French colonialists and the U.S. imperialists, we completely defeated the large aggressor army of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists. All of these armies were armies of the powerful, bellicose imperialist and reactionary powers of our times. Vietnamese volunteer forces continue to excellently fulfill their noble international obligation in Kampuchea, contributing their efforts to the restoration and development of that fraternal country amidst firmly maintained order and security after joining the revolutionary forces of Kampuchea in driving off the Pol Pot genocidal clique, the cruel and utterly inhumane lackeys established, commanded and supported by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists.

This year, on the 30th anniversary of the glorious and earth-shattering victory at Dien Bien Phu, on the 40th anniversary of the founding of the ever victorious Vietnam People's Army, the pinnacle of the great victory 5 years ago over the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists has even greater meaning. Our fatherland is inviolable. With the spirit, the strength and the self-reliance we possess and with the strong support of the Soviet Union, the other fraternal socialist countries and progressive mankind, we will surely fully implement the truth "there is nothing more precious than independence and freedom," successfully build socialism and firmly defend the beloved Vietnamese fatherland, strengthen the special alliance among Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, prevent the Chinese reactionaries from expanding into Southeast Asia and make outstanding contributions to the revolutionary undertaking of the people of the world. Vietnam's just cause always shines brightly.

7809

CSO: 4210/19

EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON BUILDING THE DISTRICT AND STRENGTHENING THE DISTRICT
LEVEL: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BUILDING THE DISTRICT AND STRENGTHENING THE
DISTRICT LEVEL

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 84 pp 38-43

[Article by Nguyen Le, the District Development Department of the Party
Central Committee]

[Text] Building the districts and strengthening the district level has been
considered a strategic task by our party for more than 10 years.

In 1970, the resolution of the 19th Plenum of the 3rd Party Central Committee
established the task of developing the district level into a level skilled in
organizing and guiding agricultural production; at the same time, it
established the district as a planning level for agriculture, small industry
and the handicraft trades.

In August, 1972, the Party Secretariat issued Notice Number 6, which announced
its decision to establish four pilot project districts. They were: Dong Hung
District in Thai Binh Province, Tu Liem District in Hanoi, Ba Vi District in
former Ha Tay Province and Tan Lac District in former Hoa Binh Province.

In mid-1973, the Party Central Committee conducted another phase of pilot
projects in five districts: Dong Hung District in Thai Binh Province, Nam
Ninh District in Ha Nam Ninh Province, Tan Lac District in Vinh Phu Province,
Tho Xuan District in Thanh Hoa Province and Quynh Luu District in Nghe Tinh
Province.

In September, 1974, the Secretariat issued Directive Number 208 on
reorganizing production and improving management on the basic level and
strengthening the district level.

In early 1976, the Council of Ministers issued Decision Number 61/CP to begin
the work mentioned above.

In late 1976, the 4th National Congress of Delegates of the Party decided to
"build strong and solid districts that truly become agro-industrial economic
units; use the district as the base for reorganizing production, organizing

and redistributing labor in a specific manner and coordinating industry with agriculture, the national economy with the collective economy, manual workers with farmers; and build the district level into a level of state government that manages a comprehensive plan and has its own budget, a level that manages production, circulation and everyday life within the district."(1)

The 2nd Plenum of the 4th Party Central Committee defined the specifics involved in this work. In January, 1978, the Political Bureau issued Directive 33 and, in February, 1978, the Council of Ministers issued Resolution 33/CP, both of which dealt with building the districts and strengthening the district level. These were followed by directives and resolutions on specific areas of this work, such as project planning, the formulation of plans within the district, the financial responsibility of the district, etc.

At the 5th National Congress of Delegates of the Party, the specifics involved in building the districts and strengthening the district level were defined in greater detail: "the structure of the district economy is a structure in which the basic units are the agricultural cooperatives and collectives, the small industrial enterprises and possibly the state farms and forestry sites of the district and the other types of production units..."(2) "Positive steps must be taken to build the districts along lines that coordinate agriculture and industry(or forestry, agriculture and industry or fishing, agriculture and industry, depending upon the specific situation of the different types of districts)."(3) "The structure of the district economy must be based on the economic conditions that exist within the district, on the guidelines of each district for specialized production and general businesses and on the requirements and capabilities of the agricultural cooperatives and collectives; at the same time, it must be closely linked to the economic development planning of the province and the entire country."(4)

Recently, the 3rd Plenum of the 5th Party Central Committee decided to continue to promote the building of the districts and the strengthening of the district level.

Why are our party and state giving such special attention to the building of the districts and the strengthening of the district level?

To begin with, it is because the district is the best base for reorganizing social production and coordinating agriculture with industry.

As we know, a new division of labor has been and is occurring within the district; coordination is being established between agriculture and industry, between the state-operated economy and the collective economy and among many different sectors and activities involved in the reproduction process; and an agro-industrial economic structure is taking shape. The building of districts that have an agro-industrial economic structure must be based on the requirements involved in the development of agricultural production as well as construction and industrial development requirements, not merely the requirements of agriculture itself.

The organization of production within agriculture, in both the North and the South, has undergone substantive change on the basis of collective ownership of the instruments of production and collective production. This substantive change demands that we reorganize production at cooperatives, closely link agriculture to industry and gradually establish an agro-industrial economic structure within a suitable area so that we can advance to large-scale, socialist production, strongly develop agriculture, truly make agriculture the base of socialist industrialization, a base that provides an increasingly large supply of grain, food, labor and agricultural raw materials to industry, and create markets and sources of capital for industrialization. In the process of transforming and developing agriculture, the state has provided competent assistance in the form of technical bases: capital, equipment and machinery, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, etc. The other sectors of the economy, such as industry, communications-transportation and so forth, have also provided support in many different ways. In many fields, production has gone beyond the framework of one basic unit and one production sector and demands the coordination of many sectors and levels.

The district is the most suitable base for establishing coordination and unity between agriculture and industry while closely coordinating the central economy and the local economy. In actuality, it is within the district that this coordination occurs. In some areas, this coordination even occurs within individual cooperatives, such as the processing of agricultural products, the processing of products for exportation, etc. The districts of Dien Ban (Quang Nam-Da Nang), Hung Ha (Thai Binh), Hai Hau (Ha Nam Ninh), Van Chan (Hoang Lien Son), Long Phu (Hau Giang) and so forth are models of rather clear and wide-ranging coordination between agriculture and industry, between the central economy and the local economy, among the state-operated, collective and household economies and among cooperatives.

It can be said that this is a necessary step during the period of transition from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production without experiencing the stage of capitalist development and is the course best suited to the specific conditions of our country.

The district is also the most suitable base for carrying out the reorganization and redistribution of labor.

The reorganization of production and the coordination of agriculture with industry within the district must be closely linked to reorganizing and redistributing labor for the purposes of making full use of and developing the strengths that lie in our abundant labor, in our large amount of undeveloped land and undeveloped natural resources and carrying out production throughout the year. These strengths must be developed even in the initial stage of the period of transition to socialism, and the most suitable base for properly coordinating our abundant labor with our arable land, with common and improved tools and with our existing equipment and machinery in order to produce much material wealth for society is the district.

The reorganization and redistribution of labor within the district must be carried out in exact accordance with established planning and guidelines and must result in the development of many trades suited to the conditions of each

district and cooperative and in the establishment of sources of raw materials that are primarily local. However, at places that have traditional trades and in the outskirts of cities, appropriate use must be made of the contract ordering of goods.

The management of labor within the district must be based on a unified plan and labor must be mobilized for large jobs, such as the building of water conservancy projects, the improvement of fields, the building of schools, hospitals and so forth, with a view toward stimulating the development of production within each cooperative and gradually building the new countryside while meeting the common requirements of the district.

The organization, redistribution and management of social labor within the district must be based on three requirements: the requirements of cooperatives; the requirements of the district; and the requirements of the province and the entire country.

Attention must be given to the fact that overall planning and sector planning include the planning of the distribution of labor, population and population centers. In the reorganization of hamlets and villages, careful consideration must be given to the various relations that exist, including the relations within ethnic communities, and consideration must be given to continuity and to the experiences of places that have already performed similar work. In the mountain districts and the districts of the Central Highlands, we must closely coordinate the opening of new economic zones with the settlement of nomads. Realizing that "contentment with one's work is second to having a good place to live," we must coordinate population planning with the zoning of production areas so that farmers have a feeling of attachment to their fields and gardens.

Reorganizing production means re-examining the use of land, reallocating crops and livestock, developing the trade sector in a truly rational manner and, on this basis, reorganizing and redistributing labor within each basic unit and within the district. The reorganization of production must be closely linked to the reorganization and redistribution of labor.

The district is not only a suitable base for reorganizing production, for reorganizing and redistributing labor; it is also a good base for coordinating production with circulation, organizing distribution-circulation and organizing the material and cultural lives of the people within the district.

Once it has organized and is properly utilizing its labor, tools, arable land and natural resources, the district must, on the basis of encouraging and organizing production, expanding and managing the market, procure agricultural, forestry and marine products as well as the other types of goods within the district and organize the efficient distribution of the materials and goods supplied by the upper level and those that are produced by the district itself in order to meet the needs of the production and daily lives of the people of the district and fulfill obligations to the state.

The improvement of the material and cultural lives of the people within the district is dependent upon the level of development of production and

increases in the overall labor productivity of society as a whole. However, the realities of the past several years prove that the district level plays an important role in this regard. The district is truly becoming a level that directly guides the units that produce grain and food products as well as a number of consumer and export goods; a level that directly manages the units engaged in distribution and circulation; and a level that directly guides the educational, cultural and public health facilities serving the people of the district. Clearly, the district level is capable of properly caring for the material and cultural lives of the people within the district, meeting the food, clothing, shelter, travel, educational and health care needs of the people better with each passing day and fulfilling obligations to the state.

The district is also a suitable base for coordinating the economy with the national defense system.

The coordination of the economy with the national defense system within the district begins when planning production areas, planning economic-technical centers and population centers and extends to the construction of the road system and the network of irrigation canals and ditches, the planting of forests, the organizing of production units, water conservancy units, fishing units, etc. Labor must be organized in such a way that the labor force is also a national defense force, a local combat force, a local rear service force. From the perspective of national defense, this coordination also encompasses altering and improving the terrain, establishing the deployment of forces and establishing a people's war posture. At present, the objectives of this coordination are to protect socialist property, maintain political security and social order and safety and resist the wide-ranging war of sabotage being waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists while maintaining combat readiness and being prepared to deal with a war of aggression unleashed by them.

Reorganizing production, reorganizing and redistributing labor, coordinating production with distribution-circulation, organizing the lives of the people, introducing scientific and technological advances in production and so forth, all of these are elements of the three revolutions (the production relations revolution, the scientific-technological revolution and the ideological and cultural revolution) that are being simultaneously carried out every hour of every day within the district. The district directly builds and strengthens the economic, political, social and other bases of the dictatorship of the proletariat and builds a solid alliance between workers and farmers under the leadership of the working class. The district directly develops upon the superior nature of socialist production relations and establishes the conditions needed to promote scientific and technological advancement and stimulate the development of the new culture and the molding of the new, socialist man. Viewed from these perspectives, the district is, in general terms, a good base for simultaneously carrying out the three revolutions in the countryside.

The realities of the past several years have very clearly shown the significance and importance of building the districts and strengthening the district level in the socialist revolution within our country. This work is now being strongly promoted and has begun to yield good results. In the years

ahead, on the basis of the experience gained by the districts, we must perform the following several specific jobs well:

1. We must re-examine and make changes to the overall planning and the planning of each sector within the district. This planning must assume the nature of comprehensive socio-economic planning consistent with zoning and planning requirements of the province and the central level; at the same time, it must correctly reflect the distribution of the specialized production of each sector within the territory and provide the basis for rearranging the structure of production and redistributing labor within each field.

One of the factors of decisive importance in re-examining and amending district planning is the need to establish correct basic guidelines and deploy production forces in a relatively stable manner so that all efforts can be focused on developing agricultural production, forestry, fishing, small industry, the handicraft trades and industry in the 1980's, thus winning a large victory in the present stage and laying the groundwork for comprehensive development in the next stage. This requires comprehensive study of the position, the terrain, the natural conditions and the socio-economic characteristics of each district.

2. We must improve the formulation of district and installation plans. Upon the completion of planning (which includes installation planning), we must improve the way that plans are formulated in order to immediately express the requirements of planning as specific norms of the 1984-1985 plan and do so in the spirit of democratizing the plan and fully upholding the right of districts and installations to assume responsibility on their own and take initiative. The plan of each district must be formulated and put together from the basic level upward and balanced on the basis of the four capabilities defined in Council of Ministers' Resolution Number 50.

3. We must continue to assign management responsibilities to the district in keeping with Council of Ministers' Resolution Number 56, thus laying the foundation for planning by the district and providing the district with additional responsibility and authority, better conditions, additional means and so forth.

4. Efforts must be focused on implementing a number of policies well, such as those policies that deal with establishing the district's grain supply, determining the supply of goods to the district and calculating the district's commerce discount and the percentage of products that may remain within the district; formulating and managing the district budget; streamlining, augmenting and strengthening the district apparatus and its contingent of cadres, especially the economic management apparatus at enterprises, corporations, stations, farms, etc.

5. We must continue to build material-technical bases within the district; continue to carry out socialist transformation and improve the socialist production relations; and reorganize and rearrange production forces along lines that closely link agriculture to industry, production to distribution-circulation and result in the establishment of new production and business ties. All of these efforts must be designed to develop production, both in

magnitude and quality, raise labor productivity, raise national income, improve the quality of business management, support production and everyday life better and eliminate the negative phenomena within economic and social life.

In the building of material-technical bases supporting production and everyday life, the guideline "the state and the people working together" must be applied. However, the application of this guideline must be based on upholding the right of collective ownership of the laboring people, must be based on state law and must not be haphazard or unorganized.

Building the districts and strengthening the district level are a large and very complicated matter, one which involves many jobs that must be performed not only on the district level, but also on the provincial level and within the central sectors at the same time. For this reason, Le Duan has said: "The leadership agencies of the party and government, the central sectors and the provinces and municipalities must consider building the districts and strengthening the district level to be one of their immediate, central tasks. They must clearly define the specific requirements and the work methods of their sector or level within the district and must, through their work of supporting, assisting, guiding and inspecting the districts and installations, establish for their sector or level an efficient structure and the best possible management procedures. It must be realized that building district agro-industrial economic units lays the foundation of the economic structure of the province, the municipality and the entire country and that establishing the new system within each district lays the foundation of the new system in the rural areas of the entire country."(5)

FOOTNOTES

1. The resolution of the 4th National Congress of Delegates, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1977, p 63.
2. The Proceedings of the 5th National Congress of Delegates, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1982, Volume 1, p 58.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p 59.
5. Speech by Le Duan at the 6th Plenum of the 4th Party Central Committee, August, 1979.

7809

CSO: 4210/19

THAI BINH BUILDS ITS DISTRICT PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND STRENGTHENS ITS BASIC ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PARTY

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 84 pp 43-49

[Article by Truong Dang Hoa, chief of the Organization Department of the Thai Binh Provincial Party Committee]

[Text] Thai Binh, a densely populated, coastal lowland province that measures 1,495 square kilometers, is completely enclosed by 52 kilometers of coastline and hundreds of kilometers of major rivers. The province has a population of 1.5 million but only has 100,000 hectares of farmland; of this amount, only about 80,000 hectares lie in rice fields. Thai Binh has seven districts and one city. On the average, each district has 14,000 hectares of farmland and a population of roughly 200,000.

In view of these circumstances and in order to properly fulfill obligations to the state and stabilize the living conditions of the people of the province while gradually making Thai Binh a province that has a developed agro-industrial structure, our party organization has established agriculture as the front of foremost importance. The strategic goals of our province are to accelerate the production of grain and food, fully resolve the grain problem and supply raw materials to industry for the production of consumer goods and supply agricultural products for exportation. At the same time, we seek to increase industrial, small industrial and handicraft production. Our province's guideline is: "moving forward on the basis of our land and labor and achieving development on the basis of our rice, hogs and industrial crops."

During the past several years, we have, in the building of the party, directed the attention of the various organizations of the party and its cadres and members toward complying with and supporting these goals. We have made building strong and solid district party organizations and strengthening the basic organizations of the party the central task in the work of building the party. In the process of carrying out this task, we have focused our efforts on the following several basic matters:

1. Directing the attention of the various levels and sectors within the province toward the districts and guiding them in helping the districts

formulate and implement good planning and plans for socio-economic development within the scope of the district.

To begin with, we quickly assigned management responsibilities to the districts, making them responsible for managing the economic, technical and cultural installations within the district. We maintain that in order to resolve the problems arising from the needs of production and everyday life and gradually move agricultural production forward under circumstances in which our production is still primarily small-scale production and industry is not developed, it is important to tap the sense of collective ownership of each installation and each district to a high degree. Every installation and district must be the master of its arable land and labor. The provincial level cannot take the place of the district or the installation in resolving these problems. The district level must move forward on its own and improve its leadership skills in order to rapidly meet the new requirements being faced. Assigning the districts the responsibility for managing the economic, technical and cultural installations within the district and doing so in a reasonable manner creates favorable conditions for the district level to exercise its right of collective ownership and gradually solve the problems in the production and daily life of the district well. This is an objective requirement, one that we must take positive steps to meet.

In 1978, in keeping with Political Bureau Directive 33 and Council of Ministers' Resolution 33, we virtually completed assigning the districts the responsibility for managing the economic, technical and cultural installations within the district. This transfer of responsibility significantly strengthened the material-technical bases of the districts and created the conditions for them to resolve difficulties and manage production.

In the process of guiding the assignment of management responsibilities to the districts, our provincial party committee gave its attention to correcting certain mistakes and deviations on the part of some sectors, such as their fear of losing authority, their fear that the districts would be unable to provide good management, their hesitation in turning over installations to the districts or turning installations over to the districts but transferring their cadres and removing their capital and equipment, thus posing difficulties to the districts. At the same time, the provincial party committee reminded the districts to guard against the thinking of partialism and localism, against the attitude of considering the assignment of management responsibilities to mean that the districts had become separate "kingdoms" and were in full charge of everything within the district.

The provincial party committee asked the sectors on the provincial level to provide a number of additional economic and technical cadres to the districts and help them reassign and reorganize their cadres, consolidate and strengthen their corporations, enterprises, stations, farms and so forth and establish the functions, tasks, work methods and working relationships between economic and technical installations and the district people's committee and between the sectors on the provincial level and the villages and agricultural cooperatives, thus putting these units to work supporting economic development and the daily life of the people.

Together with assigning management responsibilities to the districts, we have focused our efforts on helping the districts formulate, adjust and amend their planning and plans for socio-economic development, considering district planning to be not only the responsibility of the district, but also the common responsibility of the sectors on the provincial level. The responsible sectors have worked with the districts to formulate guidelines and plans for the development of the units of their sector within the district. The provincial party committee has reminded the sectors of the need to resist subjective, impetuous thinking and not set norms that are too high or that lack the basis needed to be implemented. At the same time, they were reminded to resist conservative thinking and the attitude of relying upon or waiting for investments and assistance from the upper level. The province has not pressured the districts into doing anything or imposed anything upon them, instead, it has required that the districts investigate, survey and correctly evaluate their potentials and strengths and set their objectives, guidelines and course of development accordingly.

Today, all the districts in Thai Binh have completed their general planning of economic and social development. Although they must continue to be evaluated, amended and adjusted, the planning and plans of the districts generally reflect the requirements of comprehensive economic, cultural, social, security and national defense development as well as comprehensive development of the standard of living of the people within the district. The districts have concentrated on developing agriculture, small industry and the handicraft trades and begun to display self-reliance, begun to assume responsibility on their own and begun to establish the various balances within the district on their own.

On the basis of their planning and plans, the districts set about developing the potentials in their labor, arable land and existing material-technical bases in order to increase production. The clearest progress has been made in agricultural production. During the past several years, although the supply of fertilizer and materials supporting agricultural production has been smaller than in previous years, agricultural production within our province has still developed rather well as a result of the districts tapping the initiative unleashed by the new contracting system, utilizing the experiences gained in intensive cultivation, implementing the guideline "the state and the people working together" in water conservancy work and actively applying scientific and technological advances in production, especially advances in new, high yield rice varieties. During the 3 years from 1981 to 1983, an average of 158,000 hectares was under cultivation each year, an increase of 7.2 percent compared to 1980. Average rice yield was 68 quintals per hectare, an increase of 9 quintals per hectare (14 percent) compared to the five preceding years. In 1982, the districts of Dong Hung, Hung Ha and Kien Xuong recorded yields ranging from 72 to 76 quintals per hectare. Eleven cooperatives recorded yields ranging from 90 to 105 quintals per hectare. At some cooperatives, the rate of increase in rice yields has been quite high. For example, the Nguyen Xa Cooperative raised its yield from 80 quintals per hectare in 1979 to 105 quintals per hectare in 1982. The Minh Chau Cooperatives raised its yields from 70 quintals per hectare in 1979 to 96 quintals per hectare in 1982. The Duyen Hai Cooperative raised its yield from 68 quintals per hectare in 1979 to 93 quintals per hectare in 1982. Deserving

of attention is the fact that Tien Hai District, a place that encounters many difficulties and which once recorded low rice yields, averaged 60 quintals per hectare in 1982. Despite unfavorable weather, the province's 1983 winter-spring rice yield was 38.48 quintals per hectare. The amount of area under the cultivation of industrial crops has increased by 2 percent, thereby gradually establishing a number of areas that specialize in these crops. The yields of some main industrial crops, such as jute and rushes, have also increased considerably.

Industrial, small industry and handicraft production has also been accelerated. Although it is a province that practices the monoculture of rice and experiences many difficulties with raw materials, fuels and building materials, as a result of the districts trying to develop sources of raw materials within agriculture, develop local raw materials and introduce small industry and handicraft production at agricultural cooperatives, Thai Binh has still managed during the past several years to achieve a rather high rate of development in its industrial, small industry and handicraft production. The value of local industrial products rose from 124.4 million dong in 1981 to 133 million dong in 1982, with the value of handicraft products rising from 95 million dong in 1981 to 103.8 million dong in 1982. At present, 96 percent of the province's agricultural cooperatives operate handicraft trades employing 70,000 laborers. Each cooperative produces handicraft goods worth an average of 170,000 dong. Chiefly as a result of developing industry, small industry and the handicraft trades, coordination between agriculture and industry has begun to be established at installations and within the scope of districts in Thai Binh. Each district has established a number of industrial production centers, such as agricultural machine stations, enterprises producing building materials, a number of installations producing export goods, installations processing livestock feed, transport cooperatives, etc.

Due to the increase in production, the total value of our province's exports has also increased rather rapidly, from 50.6 million dong in 1980 to 145 million dong in 1981 and 247 million dong in 1982. Some districts have established local export activities. Through exports, a number of materials and goods needed to help meet the requirements of production and everyday life within the district have been imported.

In the field of distribution and circulation, the districts have gradually become involved in organizing procurements, developing sources of local goods and establishing economic ties with other districts, thus insuring the delivery of all the products required to the province and central level and meeting the essential needs of the district itself. In 1979, Thai Thuy District's trade with other localities amounted to 1.2 million dong; this figure rose to 4 million dong in 1980, 7 million dong in 1981 and 14 million dong in 1982. Through this trade, hundreds of meters of firewood, thousands of tons of coal and hundreds of thousands of pieces of bamboo of various types, all of which are products that the locality does not have, were brought to the district. Some districts have sufficient budget surpluses and stockpiled materials to take the initiative in resolving difficulties in production.

Recently, we have also been guiding households in formulating economic development plans consisting of a production plan, a plan on the delivery of products and an expenditure plan for the family. On this basis, we have helped families take the initiative and meet their own needs through their own efforts. The cooperatives put together the overall plan of the entire cooperative and guide the development of the household economy in the correct direction. At present, 26 percent of the cooperatives in Thai Binh are formulating their plans from the households upward. Many installations, such as Dong Hoa and Minh Tan in Dong Hung District, Quynh Bao in Quynh Phu District and Dong Trung in Tien Hai District, have guided and directed the development of the household economy quite well.

As regards cultural and social work, each district has four or five mobile movie units, one art unit and one cultural hall that serve the people on a regular basis. Each district has three or four general middle schools and one supplementary education school. Each village has a basic level general school; one of every three persons is attending school. Each district has one or two general hospitals, each of which has from 120 to 200 beds. Each village has one public health station with 10 beds. Many villages have their own cultural hall, museum and athletic field.

The districts have also gradually linked economic construction to the strengthening of the national defense and security systems. Between 1979 and 1982, under the guideline "the state and the people working together," the districts built and upgraded hundreds of kilometers of inter-district and inter-village roads and dozens of bridges and planted tens of thousands of clumps of bamboo and rattan along the coastal defense lines. These are projects that support production and everyday life while meeting national defense requirements. Many villages have organized a combat alert force coordinated with production that maintains security within the hamlets. The military draft and the registration of reserve forces are carried out in strict accordance with requirements. Combat plans have been formulated and maneuvers have been held at each combat village and cluster. As a result, the defense capabilities of the districts have been continuously strengthened and each district is actually becoming a military fortress.

2. Solidifying and streamlining the organization, improving the leadership skills of the district party committees.

In its development from an administrative management level to a level that leads and guides production and business and provides economic management, the district level must not only improve its methods of leadership and its work methods, but must also rapidly improve its organizational and managerial skills and deepen its knowledge in every area, especially its knowledge of economics and economic management, science and technology. Therefore, in conjunction with assigning management responsibilities to the district level, our provincial party committee has regularly given its attention to solidifying and streamlining the organization and improving the leadership skills of the district party committees. The objective of the province is to establish committees of the district party committee, most importantly its standing committee, that are united, are unanimous in their views and are

truly capable of leading and managing all aspects of their work within the locality in accordance with the new requirements being faced.

It is our contention that the crux of this issue is the need to assign additional, qualified key cadres and a balanced number of additional economic management and scientific-technical cadres to the districts. Between 1979 and 1982, the province transferred hundreds of cadres to the districts, the majority of whom are young cadres, scientific-technical cadres and economic management cadres. The provincial party committee appointed a number of its members to personally serve as district party committee secretaries or deputy secretaries and transferred some cadres from the departments and sectors on the provincial level to augment the district party committees or committees and sectors within the district.

An increased effort has been made to provide training to corps of district and installation cadres and raise their overall qualifications. During the past several years, through on-the-job study and formal classroom training, we trained thousands of cadres of all types for the districts and installations. Between 1979 and 1982, we sent hundreds of district party committee members and cadres of district committees and sectors to attend political training courses at the party schools of the central level and the province. Some 56 members of district party committee standing committees have attended on-the-job college classes in economics and technology on the provincial level. The Agricultural Middle School, the School of Finance and the Cooperative Management Cadre Training School of the province have also held many classes to train for the districts thousands of cadres who have a middle level education in agricultural technology and economic management.

Today, 68 percent of the district party committee members in Thai Binh have a middle school education in political theory (100 percent of the members of the district party committee standing committees have a middle level education and 4.7 percent have a college level education in political theory); 41.3 percent of district party committee members have a college education in economics or technology and 67 percent have a level III academic education. The average age of district party committee members has declined from 43 in 1979 to 41.3 in 1982. With their present makeup, the various committees of the district party committees have begun to meet comprehensive leadership requirements. District party committee members are in charge of all important economic and technical sectors and all installations that are of key importance from the perspective of security and national defense; 30 percent of district party committee members are personally in charge of work at installations.

At present, we are directing and assisting the districts in formulating and implementing work regulations of the district party committee and the basic level party committees in order to gradually eliminate the administrative, bureaucratic style of leadership and guidance, improve economic leadership and the building of the party, eliminate unnecessary meetings and paper work, provide for more thorough inspections and maintain close contact with installations. We consider this to be one of the important areas in improving the leadership skills of the district party committees. Many districts have implemented a system of specific duties and responsibilities for each party committee member and begun to improve the activities of the district party

committee. Persons are put in charge of fully preparing major economic and national defense issues before presenting them to the district party committee for discussion; after a resolution has been issued, the district party committee puts someone in charge of organizing its implementation.

3. Strengthening and solidifying the basic organizations of the party.

In conjunction with strengthening the committees of the district party committee, we have also attached importance to solidifying the basic organizations of the party, with the focus of our attention being eliminating the existence of weak and deficient installations and upgrading all installations uniformly, considering this to be an important requirement in building district party organizations that are strong and solid.

We began this effort by helping the basic organizations of the party gain a thorough understanding of and correctly fulfill their functions and tasks. In compliance with Directive Number 55 issued by the Secretariat of the 4th Party Central Committee, we defined the five requirements in detail in a manner consistent with each type basic organization of the party: rural, enterprise, hospital, store and so forth. In particular, as early as 1978, our province conducted a review of the leadership experience of the Vu Thang Village party organization and launched a movement among the rural party organizations of the entire province to emulate, catch up to and surpass the Vu Thang Cooperative. We feel that to solidify and strengthen the basic organizations of the party, it is absolutely necessary to solidify and strengthen the cooperatives, with importance attached to strengthening their material-technical bases and accelerating production as well as the work being performed in all other areas. During the past several years, the focal point of the effort to solidify the cooperatives in Thai Binh has been to eliminate the use of "non-specific" contracts and other negative phenomena that have arisen in the course of implementing Party Secretariat Directive 100. Following each production season, the provincial party committee guides the basic organizations of the party in conducting preliminary reviews, gaining experience and correcting mistakes. Many districts hold special conferences to gain leadership experience in one area of work or another, such as the preparation of fields, seed production, the delivery of products and so forth. Recently, our provincial party committee issued a resolution that instructs cooperatives in how to develop upon the strongpoints of the contracting system, correct the mistakes that have been made regarding it and improve the system itself. We both emphasize and require that village party organizations lead cooperatives in closely managing the production of seed, the sowing of seed for seedlings, the preparation of fields and, in particular, financial accounting. In our province, facts have shown that many installation party committees have been giving light attention to providing economic leadership and management, especially to financial accounting, within the agricultural cooperatives, as a result of which many loopholes have opened, loopholes that have led to embezzlement and misuse of the property of collectives and the corruption of some cadres and party members. The various party organizations have led the cooperatives in strictly complying with the "three public reporting" regulations (public reporting of the amount of area under cultivation and the class of soil, public reporting of supply cost ceilings and public reporting of contract yield and output by each cooperative member

household). At the same time, the provincial party committee has assigned the agriculture, finance and banking sectors the responsibility of regularly coordinating with the various committees of the party in inspections conducted at installations to detect and promptly correct mistakes and take determined, stern action against cadres and party members who embezzle or misuse property.

In the work of building and solidifying the party internally, we have attached special importance to streamlining the committees of the party committees and party chapter committees and appointing the right persons to serve as key cadres, such as secretaries, chairmen, directors and the secretaries of production unit party chapters. After each production season, especially during political activity drives, party chapter congresses and basic party organization congresses, we fully explain the standards of party committee members to the masses and encourage them to criticize cadres and party members and nominate persons for leadership positions at installations.

The expulsion of unqualified members from the party has also been closely guided in recent years. During the more than 2 years spent issuing party membership cards, the Thai Binh party organization expelled from the party more than 5,000 unqualified persons (8 percent of the province's party membership). A number of weak and deficient installations expelled more than 10 percent of their party membership.

On the other hand, we have also given very much attention to developing the party. In late 1979, the provincial party committee guided the various installations in planning the development of the party in a manner closely linked to the formulation of installation cadre planning and the strengthening of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union. We guided the introduction of outstanding Youth Union members for acceptance into the party. During the 3 years from 1980 to 1982, the various party organizations selected and accepted more than 3,000 persons into the party from among the nearly 30,000 outstanding Youth Union members that were introduced by the Youth Union. At the same time, the party organizations have constantly concerned themselves with educating, training and forging party members and putting the management of party members on a regular basis. After reviewing the issuance of party membership cards, the provincial party committee required that the basic organizations of the party implement the regulations on party work, such as party member management regulations, the regulations on party activities and so forth, and provided them with guidance in this area.

Through these efforts, we have been gradually achieving uniform progress among installations. Today, some districts, such as Dong Hung, Hung Ha and Kien Xuong, have virtually eliminated the problem of weak and deficient installations. The number of good installations and the number of strong and solid installations have been constantly increasing. In 1982, more than 70 percent of the province's basic organizations of the party met the requirements of good installations and solid, strong and pure installations and some were awarded the "strong, solid and pure party organization" banner by the provincial party committee. The Dong Hung District party organization was awarded the "strong and solid district party organization" banner by the Party Secretariat.

The above are some of the steps that the Thai Binh party organization has taken in the course of building its district party organizations and solidifying the basic organizations of the party in order to promote the building of the districts and the strengthening of the district level. However, the results that have been achieved are only initial results. We must still make many more efforts in order to achieve the goal of at least one-half of the district party organizations of the province meeting the requirements of a "strong and solid district party organization" by 1985. The focal point of our efforts will continue to be guiding and helping the districts formulate and properly implement socio-economic development plans, strengthening the basic organizations of the party and achieving uniform progress among installations.

7809

CSO: 4210/19

SOME IMPORTANT MEASURES BEHIND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN DUY TIEN DISTRICT

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 84 pp 50-55

[Article by Nguyen Van My, secretary of the Duy Tien District Party Committee]

[Text] Duy Tien is a district in the lowlying area of former Ha Nam Province, now Ha Nam Ninh Province. In the past, the people encountered very many difficulties in their daily lives. "How can we free ourselves from the hardships and difficulties of production and life in the lowlying area and gradually improve the living conditions of the people?" This question tormented the party organization and people of our district for many years and demanded that the district party committee search night and day for an answer.

With the assistance and guidance of the agencies on the upper level, primarily the Ha Nam Ninh Provincial Party Committee, our district party committee, following many years of study, gradually discovered how to improve the situation. Looking back on the course that we have followed, we see that it entailed a process of simultaneously taking a host of different measures. However, they primarily involved the following major measures:

The first measure that was taken in agriculture was the construction of water conservancy projects. Water conservancy is always the factor of foremost importance within our country's agricultural production. It is of even greater importance in lowlying areas, such as our Duy Tien District. In 1962, under the light of party resolutions, the party organization and people of Duy Tien gradually began to build water conservancy projects. A very large amount of manpower was invested by the residents of Duy Tien in water conservancy projects. Between 1962 and 1976 (in 1976, Duy Tien was recognized by the Ministry of Water Conservancy as a district that had completed its farmland water conservancy system and was awarded the Labor Order 3rd Class by the state for water conservancy work), the people of Duy Tien invested 9 million mandays in the construction of water conservancy projects (actually, they invested three times this amount because subsequent repair work and the construction of the network of area and plot embankments were jobs that the locality performed on its own). They dug and excavated 15 million cubic meters of dirt; constructed 100 kilometers of area and plot embankments; dug 363 level I, level II and level III irrigation and drainage canals;

constructed 364 sluice gates; and built 20 electric pump stations with a capacity of 216,000 cubic meters per hour.

With this interconnected water conservancy network, Duy Tien has been able to overcome very many of the difficulties encountered in agricultural production and could achieve fully effective irrigation and drainage were there enough electricity to keep pumps in operation.

One problem that we faced in coordination with building water conservancy projects was the need to build a network of roads. The "hardship" and "difficulty" of the lowlying area in past years also made the party organization and people of Duy Tien constantly think about building roads to provide for convenient travel among the hamlets and villages within the district. Only with a network of convenient roads could new developments in production and daily life reach each citizen, each hamlet. Only with convenient roads could tractors and improved carts reach fields and labor productivity be raised. Realizing this, our party organization closely coordinated the construction of water conservancy projects with the construction of the road network. Canal and ditch embankments were constructed as broad, flat, stone covered roads to facilitate every means of transportation within the district. Oxcarts and improved carts with capacities far exceeding carrying poles became the primary means of transportation among farmers. Every farm family in Duy Tien has purchased an improved cart. And, it is only with this network of roads and these means of transportation that we are able to meet the urgent demands of the growing season.

After building the water conservancy system and convenient roads, we gradually began to introduce machines in fields. Realizing that mechanization was the only way to quickly improve fields and steadily advance agriculture toward large-scale production, the party organization and people of Duy Tien mechanized and improved their fields in a steady, planned manner. Since 1971, each village has had special areas that are plowed and harrowed by tractors. Duy Tien has sought all the assistance possible from the provincial and central levels and has made every effort to make full use of the 50 tractors now at the district tractor station. At present, 70 percent of the district's farmland is plowed and harrowed by tractors. In some villages, tractors are used to prepare 80 to 90 percent of farmland for cultivation. The bold introduction of machines in fields has made an important contribution to raising crop yields.

Together with the measures mentioned above, another question we faced was how to raise rice yields. In our effort to resolve this problem, we have attached very much importance to rice varieties. Duy Tien gradually introduced trial rice varieties in fields in order to select high yield varieties suited to its soil. Prior to 1962, Duy Tien only raised one 5th month-spring crop (no 10th month crop), the yield of which never exceeded 18 to 20 quintals per hectare. In 1970 and 1971, the district crossed the 4 tons per hectare per year threshold; in 1972, average yield was 4 tons. In 1974 and 1976, the average yield was 5.5 tons in each year. However, from 1977 to 1980, rice yields declined to 4 tons per hectare as a result of natural disasters.

The low rice yields of Duy Tien were largely due to our failure to find suitable varieties of rice. Prior to 1970, the "Tep Cau" variety was used throughout Duy Tien. During the years from 1974 to 1976, we introduced the Nong Nghiep 8 variety on 80 percent of our fields. Since 1980, the entire district has been using new varieties exclusively and focusing its efforts on improving the quality of fields. As a result, rice yields have markedly risen. However, besides those cooperatives that were achieving high rice yields, there were still some cooperatives at which yields were low. These low yields were partially due to the failure to improve fields, to the high acidity and salinity of the soil and to the lack of phosphate fertilizer and livestock manure. On the other hand, the failure to carefully select rice varieties also caused yields to decline. The district made investments in these villages to help them improve their fields, supplied them with much phosphate fertilizer on a priority basis and encouraged cooperative members to increase the supply of livestock manure. On the other hand, the district also assisted in the establishment of a seed selection unit at each cooperative. These units are responsible for providing an adequate supply of high quality seed to the cooperative. Today, the uniformity of rice yields has been raised among all areas of the district and the problem of rice heading at two different times has been corrected. Facts permit us to state that the Nong Nghiep 8 and dwarf Tran Chau varieties are high yield varieties of rice suited to the fields of Duy Tien.

The measures described above have been very closely linked to encouraging the sectors of the entire district to support the acceleration of agricultural production. We realize that the leadership effectiveness of the district is seen in the activities of the various sectors within the district. These sectors are agencies that have the full authority and ability to promptly meet production requirements and resolve problems arising in production at installations. Therefore, the district concentrated its efforts on improving the operations of the key sectors supporting agriculture, such as the agricultural supply, water conservancy, tractor, banking, finance and other sectors. As a result, phosphate fertilizer, nitrogen fertilizer, pesticides electric power, tractors and so forth have been promptly provided to meet the requirements of cooperatives, especially cooperatives that are encountering many difficulties. It can be said that our district has brought together the forces of the entire district and all installations to develop agriculture. And, it is because of this that rice yields have increased with each passing year, from 40 quintals per hectare in 1980 to 51 quintals per hectare in 1981 and 60.49 quintals per hectare in 1982. In 1982, grain output increased by 10 percent compared to 1981. Since the issuance of Party Secretariat Directive 100 and the subsequent policies on agriculture, the party organization and people of Duy Tien, by using their existing material-technical bases, by establishing a relatively stable method of operation, by upholding their tradition of diligent, creative labor and through its corps of increasingly experienced cadres, have moved agriculture steadily forward. The success of the 1983 5th month-spring season, during which the district recorded an average yield of 41.44 quintals per hectare, an increase of 787 kilograms per hectare compared to the 1982 5th month-spring season, and produced a total output of 25,910 tons, a 5,000 ton increase compared to 1982, made Duy Tien the district with the second highest rice yield in the province. Grain output

per capita has risen from 410 kilograms in 1981 to 428 kilograms in 1982 and 250 kilograms during the 1983 5th month-spring season alone.

In 1982, Duy Tien delivered 8,000 tons of grain to the state in fulfillment of its obligation, 4,500 tons of which represented stable obligations, an increase of 46 to 59 percent compared to previous years. During the 1983 5th month-spring season, it delivered 7,000 tons. As regards food products, 564.5 tons of pork were sold to the state.

As a result of recording bumper rice harvests, the people had "rice to eat and rice to save for another day"; however, it was the thinking of our district party committee that producing much paddy still did not make us prosperous, that prosperity had to come from producing exports. To achieve prosperity, every existing potential of the locality must be fully developed, that is, we must make full use of our fertile land to raise industrial crops and must strongly develop such traditional trades as the weaving of bamboo and rattan products, the weaving of cloth and silk, sericulture and so forth in order to take the initiative regarding export goods. We have concerned ourselves with developing the production of jute and sugarcane. At the same time, we have developed the production of peanuts and black beans. In 1983, Duy Tien sold to the state 14,000 tons of sugarcane, 300 tons of jute, 25 tons of silkworm cocoons and 100,000 meters of jute rugs. The achievements that have been recorded in export activities over the past several years have further encouraged us. In 1979 and 1980, the entire district's exports amounted to less than 1 million dong (only 570,000 dong in 1978); however, the district exported 7 million dong worth of goods in 1981 and 11 million dong worth in 1982. In 1982, Duy Tien earned the largest export profit of any district in the province. This result has given us even greater confidence in our method of operation. We have decided to give priority to the production of winter export crops that yield good returns. We will gradually allocate from 300 to 500 hectares of land for the exclusive production of export crops, focusing our efforts on the cultivation of jute, peanuts, black beans and garlic. Having been made aware of the export value of garlic by visiting and studying the experience of Thang Long Village in Kinh Mon District, Hai Hung Province, we have boldly invested more than 6 million dong to buy seed garlic and put more than 100 hectares under garlic cultivation during the 1983-1984 winter-spring season. The district's goal is 12 million to 15 million dong in garlic exports. In 1984, with the output of jute, black beans, peanuts and garlic now being produced, we will surely exceed 20 million dong in exports.

As a result of developing production, all other areas of work have been improved, the standard of living of the people has been raised, the relationship between the district and installations has constantly been strengthened and improved and the people's confidence in the leadership of the party has grown with each passing day.

We achieved the results mentioned above through a hard and bitter struggle to chart a correct course. These results have also been due to the entire process of closely linking the district to installations and using the strength and stability of each installation to build a strong and solid district. We realize that the district can only be strong when installations

are strong, just as each basic organization can only be strong when it consists of good cadres and party members.

The first thing that we did to strengthen installations and achieve uniform strength and stability among the basic organizations was to stabilize the organization and establish a standard size for the cooperatives within the district. Since 1976, 20 cooperatives within Duy Tien District have been organized as village-size cooperatives. Is the village-size cooperative consistent with the cadre force and production conditions of Duy Tien? Why must this question even be raised? In late 1980, due to the impact of many external, negative factors, a lack of internal unity and consensus occurred at a number of places and this led to wanting to divide the cooperatives into small cooperatives. Following much study, much discussion and a lengthy struggle, our district party committee unanimously agreed to maintain the village-size cooperative. Facts have shown that, since 1976, these cooperatives, such as the Chau Giang, Yen Bac, Trac Van, Moc Nam, Tien Hai, Tien Noi, Tien Tan and so forth, have experienced challenges and been tempered; they have had many good seasons and are growing and maturing in many ways. More than 40 percent of cooperatives have raised their income by 13 to 15 percent and the income of cooperative members as well as the accumulation of capital by cooperatives have constantly increased. However, there are still some cooperatives that have not developed their production, are operating at a loss and are experiencing negative, internal phenomena. Facts permit our district party committee to state: the main factor in the development of production lies not in the size of a cooperative, but in the quality of leadership provided by the party organization and the corps of key cadres, from the village to the production units. The district party committee has concentrated on streamlining and reassigning the corps of key cadres from the party committees and chapter committees to the management boards, party chapter secretaries and production unit chiefs.

New cadres have been selected from among the ranks of cadres who have been challenged at installations and competent cadres have been sent to cooperatives by the district. We have replaced 13 of 20 party committee secretaries, 8 of 20 cooperative directors and 7 of 20 village chairmen. At cooperatives, we have reorganized production units on the scale of 15 to 20 hectares of cropland and 40 to 60 laborers per unit. This size is well suited to the production conditions of Duy Tien.

Having achieved organizational stability, our district party committee then focused its efforts on building the party and promoting the performance of political tasks. It has directed the attention of the basic organizations of the party to building the party, formulating regulations and procedures governing the activities of party cells, party chapters and party organizations and using the completion of political tasks as the measurement of the quality of party organizations and chapters.

Along with giving our attention to helping weak and deficient basic organizations improve themselves, we have promptly praised and organized the study of such advanced model units as Chau Giang and Tien Noi, thus creating the conditions for the villages to develop their potentials and become advanced villages.

The changes that have occurred in Duy Tien have also been the result of the launching by our district of intense revolutionary movements among the masses in order to successfully carry out each task. We have relied upon revolutionary movements of the masses in every job that we have performed, from the construction of water conservancy projects to the building of rural roads, from the use of improved carts in place of carrying poles to the introduction of new varieties of rice in fields, the planting of export crops, etc. Intense mass movements are even more necessary at times when difficulties are being encountered in production and during the busiest times of the growing season. It can be said that launching revolutionary movements of the masses for the purpose of carrying out political tasks is an extremely important measure in the building of a prosperous and strong Duy Tien District.

In recent years, as production has developed, every aspect of the life of the people of the district has been markedly improved. Food: 60 percent of the district's families have grain reserves; shelter: 70 percent of houses are brick houses with tile roofs, in some villages, such as Bach Thuong and Chau Giang, this percentage is 80 to 90 percent and, in one production unit, the figure is 100 percent (4 years ago, this unit had only two houses of permanent construction); clothing: the following few figures show that the purchasing power of the people is quite high: the purchase of cloth goods alone has accounted for as much as 30 million of the 50 million dong in sales by the Commerce Corporation; travel: on the average, every household has a bicycle and improved cart and the people have been completely liberated from carrying heavy burdens on their shoulders. Appropriate attention has been given to collective welfare projects and schools, public health stations and hospitals have been repaired or constructed. Some 60 percent of villages have a wired radio network; 1 of every 2.8 households has a wired radio speaker and a radio; 1 of every 3 citizens is attending school; there is one doctor for every 300 persons; all elderly persons who have no means of support are subsidized by cooperatives; lunches are provided to the children at child care centers and kindergartens.

Today, each citizen of Duy Tien truly sees that his or her life has changed. The living conditions of each family have been improved in many ways. The negative phenomena in society have been gradually declining, political security and social order and safety are maintained and the people engage in production with enthusiasm and peace of mind. During the 3 years from 1980 to 1982, Duy Tien was awarded the following for the achievements that it has recorded: one Labor Order 2nd Class, two Labor Orders 3rd Class and one bouquet of flowers from the president of the country. The district party organization was commended and awarded the "solid and strong district party organization" banner by the Party Secretariat in 1980 and 1981.

However, Duy Tien District still has some shortcomings. We have yet to fully develop the potentials that lie in the district's labor, arable land and existing material-technical bases and agricultural production, small industry and the handicraft trades have not developed in a stable manner. The amount of guidance provided with regard to building the party, building and strengthening the government and mass agitation is not commensurate with the amount of economic guidance that has been provided.

Under the light of the resolution of the 5th National Congress and the other resolutions of the party and with the direct concern and guidance of the Ha Nam Ninh Provincial Party Committee, we will be focusing our efforts on meeting the following targets in the years ahead: an output of 43,000 to 45,000 tons of rice per year; a sugarcane output of 17,000 to 21,000 tons; a jute output of 800 to 1,000 tons; a hog herd numbering 37,000 to 40,000 hogs; the production of 15 million to 20 million dong in products by industry, small industry and the handicraft trades, with 10 million to 13 million dong in products being exported; a commodity output rate of 25 percent; delivering from 7,500 to 8,000 tons of grain in fulfillment of obligations to the state; from 570 to 600 tons of pork, live weight; and an eating standard of 18 to 20 kilograms per capita per month.

We are determined to retain and better uphold the title "strong and solid district party organization."

7809

CSO: 4210/19

STUDIES: THE LAWS OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION--
ESTABLISHING THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 84 pp 56-62 and 70

[Article by Quyet Tien]

[Text] Marxism-Leninism teaches that political power is the fundamental issue of each revolution. In this spirit, we can also say that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the fundamental issue of a proletarian revolution or socialist revolution.

In fact, without establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, the proletariat can never complete its great undertaking of abolishing capitalism and building socialism and communism. Without establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, all talk about carrying out the proletarian revolution is nothing more than empty talk.

In the doctrine of Marxism, the dictatorship of the proletariat is an issue that occupies an especially important position. Because of this, Lenin said: anyone who only acknowledges the need for class struggle but does not extend this to acknowledging the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a Marxist.

Marx often said that class struggle inevitably leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat. He also said: between capitalism and communism, there is a period of revolutionary change from one society to another; corresponding to this period is a period of political transition in which the state can be none other than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

Lenin also said: "Only those persons who understand that the dictatorship of a class is inevitable not only in each society that is based on classes, in general, not only for the proletariat once it topples the bourgeoisie, but also throughout the period of history extending from capitalism to the 'classless society,' to communism, only these persons have a true grasp of the essence of the theory of Marx concerning the state."(1)

The inevitability of the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat lies in the following: it a very effective tool of the working class and

laboring people in socialist transformation and socialist construction and in suppressing resistance by the toppled exploiting classes, overcoming the spontaneous, capitalist tendencies of small-scale producers, organizing, educating and gaining the participation of the laboring people in the work of building the new system, the new economy and the new culture and molding the new, socialist man. At the same time, it is an effective tool in the struggle to defend the socialist fatherland. In summary, the dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary in order for the working class to be able to complete its historic mission of advancing the socialist revolution to final victory, completely transforming the old society and building a totally new society in which there is no exploitation of man by man.

The concept "dictatorship of the proletariat" is quite involved. Lenin considered the dictatorship of the proletariat to be the working class' leadership (through its party) of the socialist revolution; to be a form of special alliance between the working class and laboring farmers and other laborers for the purpose of building socialism; to be the true government of the laboring people, a government that practices democracy with the laboring people and establishes dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, over the enemies of socialism; to be the continuation of the class struggle under different forms once the working class and laboring people have seized political power. In this struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat serves the function of suppression and the function of providing management, or the function of organizing-building, with organizing-building being its main function. Relying upon the organized, disciplined nature of the working class and its party, the dictatorship of the proletariat must be very strict in the fulfillment of its functions as this is the only way that it can achieve the objectives of successfully building socialism and firmly defending the socialist fatherland.

Lenin said: the dictatorship of the proletariat is the supreme impact of the revolutionary role of the proletariat in history. From these words of Lenin, we can see that the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the revolutionary nature of the working class.

The class nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat is evident in the following areas: first, it is evident in the objectives of the socialist revolution as well as the objectives of the working class, of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They are the total and complete liberation of the laboring people from every form of oppression and exploitation; the abolition of the exploiting classes and every form of exploitation of man by man; the complete transformation of the old society based on the private ownership of the instruments of production and the establishment of the new society based on the public ownership of the instruments of production, a society that has a very highly developed economy and within which each person is equal, well fed, well clothed and happy. This is a very highly organized society, a beautiful society of which the laboring people are the masters under the leadership of the party of the working class. It is a society whose culture has reached a brilliant level of development, a society in which people live by the rule "one for all, all for one" and "within which the free development of each person is the prerequisite to the free development of all persons."(2)

Secondly, it is evident in the fact that leadership within the dictatorship of the proletariat system, that is, the right to lead all society, belongs to the party of the working class.

Without the leadership of the party, the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot bring together the forces of all organizations, cannot coordinate the activities of party organizations, state agencies and mass organizations and direct them toward a common objective. Without party leadership, the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot fulfill its functions and tasks in the great socialist revolution.

There are some persons who only see that the party has a leadership role, not the working class. The persons who subscribe to this incorrect thinking automatically separate the party from the class, that is, they do not understand the revolutionary role of the working class in history. However, the leadership provided by the party cannot be separated from the leadership provided by the working class because the party is the most revolutionary, the most progressive and the best organized component of the working class. In this significance, the leadership provided by the party is also the leadership provided by the working class. Of course, the leadership of the working class can only be provided through the party, not be provided by the entire class, because of one easily understood reason: only the party--which is the most outstanding component of the working class and is armed with Marxism-Leninism--has the wisdom needed to guide the class and the nation to the victory of the socialist revolution.

Thirdly, it is evident in the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat is dictatorship of, by and for the people.

When we say that the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the revolutionary nature of the working class, we do not mean that only the working class participates in state government; to the contrary, all laboring people have the right to elect representatives to serve in state government and insure that this state, under the leadership of the party of the working class, reflects the right of socialist collective ownership of the laboring people and serves their interests. And, this is inevitable because the interests of the working class are entirely consistent with the basic and underlying interests of the laboring people and the objective of the working class is to bring the right of collective ownership and a life of happiness back to the laboring people, themselves included. Instead of weakening the leadership of the working class, this strengthens its leadership; instead of blurring the class nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it strengthens this nature.

Lenin once said: "The nature of the Soviet government lies in the following: in the past, the state was administered in one way or another by the wealthy or by capitalists; now, for the first time ever, the state is being administered by the very classes that were oppressed by imperialism and, what is more, they have joined together in large numbers in the administration of the state... It has created the conditions for all those persons who were oppressed to arise and undertake on their own all the work involved in the

management of the state, all the work involved in the management of the economy, all the work involved in the management of production."(3)

Fourthly, it is evident in the strict sense of organization and discipline, a sense of organization and discipline that originates in the nature of the revolutionary working class and is embodied most vividly in the party organization.

The dictatorship of the proletariat must maintain within itself a very high sense of organization and a very strict sense of discipline. This means that all elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat system must be organized on the basis of the principle of democratic centralism and must strictly obey the leadership of the party, scrupulously implement the lines and policies of the party and, at the same time, fully obey the laws and policies of the state and the resolutions of the mass organizations that are constituent elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This sense of organization and discipline is extremely important because, without it, it is impossible to successfully implement the revolutionary line of the party (if not to say only implement partly, not implement or even violate the line of the party) and impossible to victoriously wage the sharp struggle between socialism and capitalism during the period of transition, thus making it impossible to achieve the established goals of the revolution.

Fifthly, it is evident in the proletarian internationalism that the dictatorship of the proletariat steadfastly practices in each of its activities in the field of foreign affairs.

We know that, because of its nature, the working class is international. This international character has its basis in the common interests of the working class of all countries in the struggle against the international capitalists. In the modern age, the international solidarity of the working class of all countries is the nucleus of the solidarity of the laboring people of the entire world in the struggle against the common enemy of all nations, imperialism, in keeping with the slogan set forth by Lenin: "Proletariat of all countries and all oppressed peoples, unite!" Therefore, we do not find it unusual for the dictatorship of the proletariat in any country to need proletarian internationalism and have to establish it in practical terms, considering it to be an important part of the nature of its class.

The dictatorship of the proletariat has the following two basic functions: the function of exercising violent force and the function of organizing and building.

The function of exercising violent force is a very important function of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin once said: "The essential standard and mandatory prerequisite of the dictatorship are to use violent force to suppress the class of exploiters and, in so doing, violate 'the system of pure democracy,' that is, violate the rights of equality and freedom of that class."(4)

If it fails to exercise the dictatorship of the proletariat's function of using violent force, the working class faces the danger of losing that which it has gained in the revolution; moreover, it cannot victoriously carry out the struggle between capitalism and socialism in order to achieve the victory of socialism. This is something that has been completely confirmed by the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

However, the function of violent force, regardless of how important it might be, cannot, of itself, bring about the victory of socialism. To achieve this, the dictatorship of the proletariat must exercise its function of organizing and building, which is its primary function, because, as Lenin said: "In the final analysis, the deepest source of energy for winning victories over the bourgeoisie and the single guarantee of the solid and lasting nature of these victories can only be a new and higher mode of social production, can only be the replacement of capitalist and petty bourgeois production by large-scale, socialist production."(5) Lenin maintained that it is very difficult to exercise the function of organizing and building, with the "main difficulties lying in the economic field: establishing very tight inventory and control of the production and distribution of products everywhere, raising labor productivity and truly socializing the production sectors."(6)

The dictatorship of the proletariat's function of using violent force and its function of organizing and building are closely related to each other and both have the common objective of successfully building socialism and firmly defending the socialist fatherland. Without violent force, the dictatorship of the proletariat itself cannot survive or be strengthened, the work of organizing and building the new society cannot be successfully carried out and, even if victories are won, they cannot be maintained and preserved because of the impact of sabotage by enemies at home and abroad. Conversely, without organizing and building, sufficient forces cannot be established to successfully suppress class enemies, the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot exercise its function of using violent force and violent force itself becomes meaningless. Therefore, in practice, these two functions must be closely coordinated.

Of course, depending upon the specific situation at each place and time, one function can take precedence over another. Generally speaking, however, throughout the period of transition to socialism, the function of organizing and building must take precedence as this is the only way that the dictatorship of the proletariat can complete its historic mission of insuring the victory of socialism in the struggle between the two paths and win victory for socialist construction.

In view of its class nature and the functions described above, the dictatorship of the proletariat in every country has the following universal tasks:

First, crushing the resistance by class enemies who have been toppled by the revolution and suppressing them in their plans and activities to restore the bourgeoisie to power.

Secondly, rallying the various strata of the masses around the working class in order to carry out socialist transformation and socialist construction and prepare the conditions needed to totally abolish the classes.

Thirdly, building, solidifying and strengthening national defense forces in order to resist each scheme of aggression of foreign enemies.

Fourthly, supporting and assisting, in every way possible, the revolutionary struggle of the working class, laboring people and oppressed peoples within the countries of the capitalist system; solidifying the relations of cooperation and mutual assistance with the other socialist countries; and waging a determined struggle against imperialism while taking positive steps to safeguard world peace.

The dictatorship of the proletariat assumes many different forms depending upon the specific conditions and characteristics of each country.

The first form of the dictatorship of the proletariat to emerge in history was the Paris Commune. The commune consisted of representatives who were workers or persons acknowledged by the working class through universal suffrage. The commune was not a "parliamentary" body in the capitalist sense, but an active collective with legislative and executive functions. It was based on a truly democratic charter but not on the alliance of workers and peasants. For this and many other reasons, most notably a lack of resolve to pursue and attack the enemy until the very end, the Paris Commune was defeated shortly after it came into existence.

In the October Socialist Revolution, the Russian working class created a new form of the dictatorship of the proletariat: the soviets. The soviets came into being on the basis of the alliance of workers and peasants and through the destruction of the bourgeois state by means of violent force. During the period of transition to socialism, the exploiting classes in the Soviet Union, after being toppled, were deprived of the right to vote and prohibited from participating in the country's political life. The dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia established a one party system because the various petty bourgeois political parties refused to cooperate with the communist party on the basis of the socialist platform and joined the reactionary powers in opposing the communist party.

Following World War II, the dictatorship of the proletariat assumed the form of a people's democracy in a number of socialist countries. This form of state came into being under the special historical circumstances of the victory in the war against fascism, consequently, its social base is broader than that of the soviet form. This social base is the United National Democratic Front, the foundation of which is the alliance of workers and farmers led by the working class. In the people's democracies, multi-party systems have generally been established because the various democratic political parties joined with the communist party in the struggle against the imperialists, fascists and other reactionary powers and, following the victory of the revolution, maintained their alliance with the communist party and accepted its leadership in the building of the new society. In these countries, the individuals who belonged to the toppled exploiting classes have

the right to vote if they respect the laws of the new social system, which is possible because the laboring people hold absolute political power.

In the course of development of the world socialist revolution, the proletariat will surely create many other forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat suited to the specific conditions of each country. However, regardless of their form, these governments will still be dictatorships of the proletariat in nature.

In our country, the 1945 August Revolution led by the party of the working class resulted in the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the first worker-farmer state in Southeast Asia. In the first stage of the revolution, this state carried out the tasks of the people's national democratic revolution. In the second stage of the revolution, it has performed the historic tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This dictatorship of workers and farmers gradually evolved into and laid the foundation for the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country. It created the conditions for the birth of the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, it must be realized that, in the history of mankind, the dictatorship of workers and farmers lies within the category of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Following the victory of the war of resistance against France, the dictatorship of the proletariat came into being in North Vietnam. And, in 1975, following the victory of the resistance against the United States for national salvation, the dictatorship of the proletariat was established throughout our country.

As is the case with the dictatorships of the proletariat in other countries, the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country is of a distinct working class nature, the clearest expressions of which are the leadership provided by the party of the working class and the right of socialist collective ownership of the laboring people. The leadership of the party is the soul of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the right of collective ownership of the laboring people is one of the most fundamental features of the nature of this dictatorship. Our dictatorship of the proletariat has the same universal functions and tasks as the dictatorships of the proletariat in the other countries. Its role and impact in the struggle between capitalism and socialism as well as in the socialist revolution in our country are extremely large.

The dictatorship of the proletariat in our country plays the role of a very effective tool in carrying out the socialist revolution in each field of social life, both at home and abroad. It is the tool used to carry out the two strategic tasks established by the party: successfully building socialism while maintaining combat readiness and firmly defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland. In other words, it is the tool used to uphold the right of collective ownership of the laboring people; carry out socialist transformation and socialist construction within both the infrastructure and superstructure of society; suppress acts of resistance by class enemies, maintain political security and social order and safety; strengthen the national defense system; and resist the acts of sabotage and aggression of

external enemies, thereby making positive contributions to the revolutionary undertaking of the working class and laboring people of the entire world.

The impact of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country has been very large. In the past, the dictatorship of the proletariat in the North mobilized every material and moral potential of the socialist North, even mobilized tremendous international support and assistance for the fight to defeat the U.S. imperialist aggressors, thereby firmly defending the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and making the most decisive contribution to the victory of the resistance against the United States for national salvation, the liberation of the South and the reunification of the fatherland. It also played a tremendous role in every aspect of socialist transformation and socialist construction in the North.

Ever since our country began the transition to socialism, our dictatorship of the proletariat has been making large contributions in promoting the three revolutions and implementing the general line and the line on building the socialist economy set forth by the party; at the same time, it mobilized the strength of the nation and the strength of international support for the victory over the two wars of aggression unleashed by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists against our country on the southwestern border and the northern border of the fatherland.

Of course, our victories have been limited to some degree by our relaxation of the dictatorship of the proletariat at times and by our failure to attach importance to strengthening it, to making full use of it in the struggle between capitalism and socialism during the period of transition in our country.

The form of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country is a people's democracy. Despite this, it still retains the full nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In order for the dictatorship of the proletariat to have an even greater impact in the struggle between socialism and capitalism as well as in the great socialist revolution in our country, we must further strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country in keeping with the guidelines set forth by the 4th and 5th Congresses of the Party, that is, we must strengthen the various elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat (the party, the state, the mass organizations and the various cultural and social organizations) and establish the correct relationship among leadership by the party, ownership by the people and management by the state.

By doing this, we will have attached importance to applying one of the universal laws of the socialist revolution: establishing and strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat.

FOOTNOTES

1. V.I. Lenin: "Complete Works," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1963, Volume 25, p 481.

2. K. Marx and F. Engels: "Selected Works," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p 71.
3. V.I. Lenin: "Selected Works," Vietnamese version, Progress Publishing House, Moscow, pp 555-556.
4. V.I. Lenin: "Selected Works," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1960, Book II, Part II, p 53.
5. Ibid., p 209.
6. V.I. Lenin: "Selected Works," Vietnamese version, Progress Publishing House, Moscow, p 469.

7809

CSO: 4210/19

END